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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL

ROBERT ALAZORK,

)

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

)

HAUL n' RIDE, INC.,

)

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

I.

No. 2002-CV-3024

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Alazork ("Plaintiff') from the Order of the First District Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Potter County Circuit Court granting summary judgment
in favor of the Defendant-Appellee Haul n' Ride, Inc. ("Defendant") in
case number 2002-CV-3024.1
In affirming the Potter County Circuit Court, the First District addressed assignments of error related to three separate causes of action:
intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and deceptive business practices.
On the claim of intrusion upon seclusion, the First District held that the
Plaintiff had failed to establish any of the requisite elements for the intrusion upon seclusion as defined by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (adopted by the State of Marshall). 2 On the issue of defamation,
the First District held that the Defendant's statements did not constitute

defamation as defined by the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

(adopted

by the State of Marshall) and were properly classified as opinions or, at
the very least, fair comment. 3 Finally, on the issue of deceptive business
practices, the First District found the absence of any disputed material
facts and, therefore, employed a strict breach of contract analysis from
which it held that the Defendant did not in fact breach the contract. 4 On
these bases, the First District affirmed summary judgment in favor of
5
Defendant Haul n' Ride.
Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of Computer and Information Law. B.A., 1993, Xavier
University; J.D. Candidate, 2004, The John Marshall Law School.
1. R. at 1-2, 10.
2. R. at 7.
3. R. at 8.
4. R. at 9-10.
5. R. at 10.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The undisputed facts follow. Robert Alazork is a twenty year-old
sophomore who attends Capitol College, a private liberal arts college in
Capitol City, West Ducoda. 6 He is a U.S. citizen of Zorkesian descent,
born and raised in the State of Marshall.7 He currently is, and at all
times relevant to this litigation was, a resident of Smallville, a8 suburb of
Marshall City in the eastern region of the State of Marshall.

A.

BABAZORK SCHOLARSHIP

Alazork received a scholarship for academic excellence from the
Zorkesian-American Society of Marshall for the 2000-2001 academic
year. 9 Applicants were required to submit an essay that described the
importance of community involvement in both American and Zorkesian
societies. A scholarship committee reviewed the essays and interviewed
each of the applicants. 10 After the committee reduced the application
pool to three, the remaining applicants met with Tom Babazork, the benefactor who sponsored the yearly scholarship. 1 ' Babazork then selected
12
the scholarship recipient.
Alazork applied for the scholarship in January 2000, and in May
2000 was told that he had been selected as the recipient for 2000-2001.33
Babazork presented the award to Alazork at the annual ZorkesianAmerican Society meeting. 14 In his acceptance speech, Alazork spoke
about the importance of excelling in school, serving the community, and
honoring one's heritage. 15 Between May and August 2000, Alazork
served as a spokesperson for the Zorkesian-American Society, attending
a number of meetings and speaking to several community
16
organizations.
B.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTACT WITH DEFENDANT

Alazork spent the summer of 2000 living with his parents in
Smallville and working as a counselor for a city-sponsored day camp for
underprivileged children. 17 He planned to move into an off-campus
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

R. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 2-3.
Id.
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apartment one week prior to the start of Capitol College's fall semester
(classes began on September 9, 2000).18
1.

Phone Conversation

On August 16, 2000, Alazork called the national toll-free number for
Haul n' Ride, a rental truck company, and was automatically connected
to the company's Smallville location. 19 Upon connection, he spoke with
John Streeter, an employee of Haul n' Ride who acted as the Smallville
rental agency manager. 20 Streeter explained that Haul n' Ride offers
two types of rentals, local and one-way. 21 He defined locals as being
rentals where the truck is used in town and is returned to Defendant's
Smallville location. 2 2 He explained that one-way rentals were rentals in
which the truck is taken out of state and returned to a different Haul n'
Ride location. 23 The one-way rentals were much more expensive than
local rentals. 24 Streeter explained that the one-way move rate was
higher because of the cost of maintaining a national network of Haul n'
Ride locations and because the company's insurance expenses were much
higher for rentals in which a truck was driven in more than one state. 25
After listening to Streeter's explanations, Alazork reserved a truck
26
for three days as a local move.
2.

Rental Agreement and Disclosure of Personal Information

When Alazork rented the Haul n' Ride he was asked to volunteer
information including his name, current and past addresses, present and
former telephone numbers, mobile and work phone, three financial references and three personal references. 2 7 Alazork complied with the requests and identified Tom Babazork as his financial and personal
reference. He told Streeter that he needed the truck to move back to his
university for the fall semester. 28 Alazork's rental agreement provided
that he would depart with the truck on August 20 and return August 23,
2000.29

18. R. at 3.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 4; see also R. at Ex. B.
R. at 4-5.
R. at 5.
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C.

PLAINTIFF'S USE OF DEFENDANT'S RENTAL TRUCK

On August 22, Alazork arrived at Capitol College, which lies approximately thirty miles east of the Marshall state line. 30 He drove to his
apartment building located two blocks from campus. 3 1 He doubleparked the truck in front of the apartment building and began unloading
his belongings and furniture. 3 2 The unloading took more time than he
had anticipated. 3 3 He finally finished moving in at 6:00 p.m. on August
23.34 Alazork decided to park the truck and drive it back to Streeter's
Haul n' Ride location early the next morning. 35 However, Capitol City
municipal rules dictate that no trucks can be parked on city streets overnight.3 6 Therefore, Alazork parked the truck in the convenience store
mall parking lot across the street from his apartment. 37 This mall had a
convenience store, a cleaner, and an adult bookstore. 38 Alazork attempted to return the Haul n' Ride truck on August 24, 2000, one day
later than the rental agreement required. 39 However, the Smallville
storefront was closed when he arrived, so he left the keys in the after40
hours box and returned to Capitol College.

D.

DEFENDANT'S DISCLOSURES

On August 23, Streeter received a notice from the Haul n' Ride corporate office alerting him to a possible terrorist threat where a Haul n'
41
Ride truck might be used to carry explosives into Capitol City.
Streeter immediately used GPS technology to determine the location of
42
all of his rental trucks that were not presently on his dealership lot.
Most of Haul n' Ride trucks are equipped with global positioning system ("GPS") technology. 43 GPS technology employs a network of satellites and ground stations that continuously transmit data over radio
frequencies, along with devices that receive these transmissions and use
them to calculate their own location via a method known as triangulation. Some devices that receive GPS transmissions are also capable of
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 6.
Id.
R. at 5; see also R. at Ex. C.
Id.
R. at 3.
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44
transmitting their location data so that it can be accessed remotely.
Location data can be correlated with other data to provide emergency
services, navigation or travel information, stolen vehicle tracking, and
other services. 4 5 GPS technology allows Haul n' Ride dealers to track
the movement of their trucks and to locate them immediately in case of
mechanical malfunction, accident or theft.4 6 Each GPS device installed
by Haul n' Ride maintains a trip log, recording the precise distance and
route that the truck took.4 7 The dealer can access this log upon the vehicle's return. 48 These GPS devices are located in the truck's engine com50
partment. 49 Alazork's truck was equipped with such a device.

In recent years, Haul n' Ride has been the subject of negative publicity regarding the use of its trucks to transport immigrants into the country illegally and to transport illegal weapons and explosives within the
country. 5 1 Several reports have suggested that Haul n' Ride trucks
might be used in terrorist acts specifically involving extremist Zorkesians. 5 2 As a result, Haul n' Ride instituted a corporate "anti-terrorism"
policy. 5 3 Under the policy, all Haul n' Ride dealers are required to request additional personally identifiable information when the renting
customer appears suspicious. The policy specifically recommended that
dealers scrutinize renters of Zorkesian descent and those customers who
54
do not disclose their intentions upon renting a vehicle.
Upon using the Defendant's GPS system, Streeter discovered that
the truck Alazork had rented was located in Capitol City. 55 The GPS
system gave him a street address, which he ran through a reverse directory on the Internet and identified as the address for an adult bookstore. 5 6 Streeter began contacting Alazork's references, and first called
Babazork. 57 He informed Babazork that he had received a report of suspected terrorist activity and had learned that Alazork transported the
rented truck out of state in violation of the rental agreement. 58 He disclosed to Babazork that he was worried Alazork "might be involved or in
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

R. at 3-4.
Id.
R. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trouble."5 9 Streeter also informed Babazork that the truck had been
parked at an adult bookstore in Capitol City and gave Babazork the
60
bookstore's street address.
E.

CANCELLATION OF SCHOLARSHIP AND PLAINTIFF'S COMMUNICATIONS
WITH BABAZORK

Fearful of the negative publicity the Zorkesian-American Society
would receive if it were leaked that the organization's scholarship recipient and spokesperson was associated with terrorist activity, Babazork
cancelled Alazork's scholarship. Babazork made no attempt to verify the
61
accuracy of Streeter's comments.
After Alazork had returned the Defendant's truck and arrived back
at college, he was informed that his scholarship had been revoked and
that he would have to pay the full tuition and room and board for the
semester prior to starting classes. 6 2 When Alazork confronted Babazork
about his scholarship situation, Babazork told him, "I received a call
from Haul n' Ride. They told me you were suspected of renting a truck
for terrorist activity. They also told me that you were parked at the
adult bookstore. We, in the Zorkesian-American Society, cannot afford
that kind of publicity. If people were to hear that we paid for the education of a suspected terrorist, we would lose all of our members and come
63
under heavy government scrutiny. We cannot accept this kind of risk."
Alazork was forced to quit school at Capitol College because he could not
afford the tuition and fees. 64 On September 10, 2000, the student-run
newspaper, the Capitol College Gazette, which is read by nearly all the
1,500 undergraduate students, ran a front-page story about Alazork's
65
scholarship being revoked.
F.

DEFENDANT'S EXPLANATION TO PLAINTIFF

When Alazork called Haul n' Ride to try and determine what happened, Streeter informed him that because he took the truck across state
lines, his credit card had been charged for the one-way rental at $1,900,
66
rather than the local rate of $324 he had originally been quoted.
Robert Alazork filed a three-count lawsuit based on this experience. 6 7 The Potter County Circuit Court granted Defendant's motion for
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 7.
Id.
R. at 6.
Id.
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summary judgment on all counts. The First District Court of Appeals
affirmed the Circuit Court decision. This appeal followed.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Three issues have been raised on appeal which can be restated as:
(1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Plaintiff failed
to established the requisite elements to evidence a theory of intrusion

upon seclusion as defined by the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS;

(2)

whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Defendant's
statements to third parties were not defamatory but rather opinions or
fair comment; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying a
strict breach of contract analysis to Plaintiffs claim for deceptive business practices, pursuant to the State of Marshall's Deceptive Business

Practices statute,

MARSHALL REVISED CODE,

505 MRC 815/2, and holding

that the Defendant had no contractual obligation to inform Plaintiff that
it employed GPS technology to track its vehicles.
IV.

BACKGROUND

The following Background Section is divided into four parts. The
first part discusses the GPS technology from which this action arose.
The remaining three parts discuss each of the three substantive areas in
dispute: intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and deceptive business
practices.

A.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

GPS is a satellite based radio-navigation system which permits
land, sea and airborne users with GPS receivers to determine their
three-dimensional position, velocity, and time twenty-four hours a day,
in any weather condition, anywhere in the world. The satellite system is
owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense for military applications. However, the system includes a frequency accessible to commercial and consumer users with GPS receivers.
1.

The GPS Technology

The GPS technology consists of three segments: space, control, and
user. The GPS space segment utilizes a constellation of twenty-four
satellites in six circular orbits approximately 10,000 miles above Earth.
These GPS satellites orbit the Earth every twelve hours emitting continuous navigation signals. The distance in space between the satellites enables a minimum of six satellites will be in view to users at any time,
anywhere in the world.
The GPS control segment involves the operations of a master control
station, five monitor stations, and three ground antennas. The monitor
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stations track the navigation signals from the satellites. The master
control station processes this information to determine satellite orbits
and to update each satellite's navigation message. The master control
station uses the ground antennas to transmit the updated information to
each satellite.
The GPS user segment consists of the personal receivers, processors
and antennas that allow individual operators to receive GPS satellite
broadcasts and compute their position, velocity, and time. Each GPS
satellite transmits a position and time signal. 68 From this information,
anyone with the proper personal GPS technology can identify their exact
location anywhere in the world. The personal technology (i.e., a GPS receiver) calculates a user's position on Earth by measuring the distance
from the receiver to a group of the GPS satellites in space. Specifically,
the receiver measures the time delay for a signal to travel between the
receiver and satellites. This delay constitutes the direct measurement of
the apparent range to the satellite. The receiver collects measurements
simultaneously from three satellites to facilitate its calculation of the
three dimensions of position, velocity, and time. This process is commonly referred to as "triangulation." Once calculated, the receiver displays the information in the form of a geographic position using specific
longitude and latitude. 69 Some GPS receivers are equipped with display
screens that show a map to illustrate location.
2.

Scope of Service

The advent of GPS has prompted a broad range of military, scientific, industrial, commercial, and consumer applications of the technology. Military applications of GPS include navigation (land, sea, and air)
and mapping. Scientists use GPS to measure the movement of the arctic
ice sheets, the Earth's tectonic plates, and volcanic activity. Industries
such as mining, construction and shipping use GPS for precision mapping data and location information. Airlines and shipping companies use
GPS to acquire mapping data. GPS technology has expanded quickly
68. U.S. Navy, USNO NAVSTAR Global PositioningSystem, GPS Capabilities,available at http://tycho.usno.navy. mil/gpsinfo.html#sig (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). The satellites transmit on two L-Band frequencies and provide two levels of service. Id. The
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) is available to all GPS users on a continuous, worldwide basis with no direct charge. Id. SPS provides a positioning accuracy of within 100
meters. Id. The Precise Positioning Service (PPS) is intended for the use of the U.S. Dept.
of Defense for military and other authorized applications. Id. PPS provides a positioning
accuracy of within 22 meters. Id. The PPS service is protected by cryptography. Id.
69. If a fourth satellite can be received, altitude can be figured as well. U.S. Navy,
USNO NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, GPS Time Transfer, available at http://
tycho.usno.navy.mil/ gpsinfo.html#tt> (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). If the user is moving,
the receiver may be able to calculate speed and direction of travel to estimate times of
arrival to a specific location. Id.

46

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXI

with respect to automobiles. Drivers can use GPS receivers with elec70
tronic displays to obtain directional and mapping information.
3. Present Application
The uses above primarily involve an individual with a receiver to
identify his or her position and that of the vehicle in which the receiver
has been installed. However, GPS receivers also have unique identifiers
(imagine each cell phone having a unique cell phone number), and often
also include storage and transmission capabilities. In certain circumstances, other individuals can use the identifiers to locate a particular
receiver if they have the proper information. These tracking abilities facilitate search and rescue operations (i.e., locating black boxes from airplanes, tracking lost hikers), law enforcement efforts to locate stolen
vehicles (and other property with GPS receivers), and parental efforts to
monitor the driving habits of their of children. 7 1 In addition to the applications identified above, car and truck rental agencies have begun to use
GPS receivers to track vehicles and monitor renters' driving behaviors.
This appeal involves such use of GPS technology by the Defendant.
B.

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

Currently, there is no precedent either through state courts or under
federal legislation regarding GPS technology and one's recourse on the
issue of an invasion of privacy - specifically intrusion upon seclusion. To
be liable for the tortious intrusion upon seclusion, one must show: (1) an
unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) the intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the
matter on which the intrusion occurs must be private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. 7 2 Intrusion upon seclusion is a theory that allows for liability when the plaintiff did not consent to the
physical intrusion in an area that is legally recognized or the unwarranted sensory intrusion. 73 The fundamental nature of this theory cen70. Dan Caterinicchia, FCC Sets Tech Standardsfor Cellular 911 Calls, available at
http://www.cnn.com/TECH /computing/9909/20/fcc.911.idg (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). GPS
technology is also being incorporated into cellular phones to implement the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) required caller location information for 911. Id.
71. Topcon Positioning Systems, Inc., Data Recording, available at http://www.top
conps.com/Company/receiver-requirements.html#Data%20Recording (last visited Feb. 17,
2003). Certain technologies can record GPS information for later review by computer. See,
e.g., Jayson Blair, G.P.S. Aids Investigators at Attack Site, available at http://www.links
point.com/nyt/G_P_SAids.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
72. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E. 2d 900, 904 (Ill. 1990). Lack of intimate personal
facts or prying into legitimate private activities precluded tort. Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.
3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995).
73. Shulman v. Group W. Prod., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
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ters on the idea of seclusion. 74 "To prove actionable intrusion, a plaintiff
must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory
privacy surrounding... or obtained unwanted access to data about, the
75
plaintiff."
Intrusion upon seclusion, one of the four invasion of privacy torts,
could be the easiest to apply to the GPS context. 7 6 It is not required for
this type of intrusion to be physical, in that it can also be sensory, as long
as an individual's private concerns have been impinged upon. 77 Whether
the intrusion on seclusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person, is a
78
paramount deciding factor.
Using this theory, Alazork can argue that the intrusion upon seclusion that he suffered was offensive to a reasonable person. Alazork can
state that he was forthright with his dealings with Haul n' Ride, provided the company with all of the background information for the rental
agreement, and was late with returning the truck by only the next morning. Alazork can argue that Haul n' Ride did not need to take such drastic measures as contacting his references and alerting them that he may
be taking part in terrorist activities, which was purely speculation.
Alazork will contend that Haul n' Ride's drastic assumption is highly offensive to himself, a reasonable person, and he should not have lost his
scholarship over their careless accusation.
However, a trial court must determine whether this conduct meets
the "offensiveness" standard for the intrusion upon seclusion claim. 79 In
determining the degree of intrusion, the court needs to evaluate the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion.8 0 In addition, the court must look at the intruder's motive, the setting, and the
expectation of those whose privacy was invaded.
Haul n' Ride may argue that due to the state of high alert the country is under because of recent terrorist bombings, it was not unreasonable in initiating a search for its missing truck. In addition, since Haul n'
Ride trucks have been the vehicles used in several of these bombings, the
company is extra cautious in keeping track of its vehicles to try and prevent any damaging events. The FBI sent out a notice that that there was
a potential terrorist threat and the attackers may use a rental truck in
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Aaron Reneger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 Hastings L.J. 549,
558 (2002).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
78. Id.
79. James W. Hilliard, A FamiliarTort that May Not Exist in Illinois: The Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's Seclusion, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 601, 611 (1999).
80. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1282
(Nov. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Nat. Broad.Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
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Capitol City. Haul n' Ride, in turn, used its GPS technology to track any
of its vehicles not accounted for in its rental lot. It found the truck that
Alazork rented, which was only to be a local rental, but instead had
crossed state lines and was in Capitol City. Not only had Alazork violated his local rental contract terms, but also the vehicle's return was
late and it was parked in the lot of an adult bookstore in Capitol City.
This set of facts alarmed Haul n' Ride that this could be a possible terrorist positioning the truck for a bombing attempt. Haul n' Ride argues that
it acted reasonably and used care in contacting Alazork's volunteer references to inform them to the fact that, based on the recent FBI alert, he
may be involved or in trouble.
In the case of United States v. McIver, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld law enforcement's warrentless placement of a GPS-device on the undercarriage of a suspect's car holding that it was neither a
search nor a seizure. 8 1 The court held that since the undercarriage of a
car is part of the exterior, therefore a search was not conducted.8 2 Based
on a Supreme Court case, New York v. Class, the court held that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy to the exterior of a car.8 3 Furthermore, since the defendant remained in control and had power over of his
vehicle and the GPS-device was only a technical trespass, no seizure
84
occurred.
Alazork may argue that the GPS device was in fact, not on the exterior of the car, but instead in the engine compartment. Also, he could
argue that he was prevented from having power and control over his vehicle due to the intrusive tracking of his movements. Therefore, Alazork
could argue that it was an unwarranted search and seizure and an unreasonable violation of his privacy in using the vehicle.
In defense, Haul n' Ride can argue that the GPS language is located
in the terms and conditions of the rental agreement, that the customer
had knowledge that this system exists and it was located in each vehicle.
Haul n' Ride may also argue that by completing the standard rental
agreement and accepting the terms and conditions contained within the
agreement, Alazork consented to any intrusion, thereby negating any
claim he raised. Haul n' Ride contends that it has not intruded upon the
seclusion of the renter. Alazork had freedom to use the vehicle and it did
not initiate the tracking device until the FBI issued the terrorist-bombing alert. In conclusion, if Haul n' Ride can demonstrate that it fully
disclosed the presence of GPS technology in its vehicles and that Alazork
accepted these terms, it may successfully defeat Alazork's claims.
81. 186 F. 3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999).
82. Id.
83. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
84. McIver, 186 F. 3d at 1127.
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C.

DEFAMATION

To be liable for defamation, a plaintiff must show that there was: (1)
a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the statement
was an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionabilharm or the existence of speity of the statement irrespective of special
85
publication.
the
by
caused
cial harm
As to the first element, a statement is defamatory if it tends to
"harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."8 6 Such defamatory statements can be either per se or per quod. A
statement is defamatory per quod if the "defamatory character of the
statement is not apparent on its face, and extrinsic facts are required to
explain its defamatory meaning."8 7 Conversely, a statement is defamatory per se when the "defamatory character of the statement is apparent
on its face; that is, when the words used are so obvious and materially
harmful to the plaintiff that injury to his reputation may be presumed."8 8 Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and the common
law, there are four categories of defamatory per se statements: (1) words
that impute a criminal offense or moral turpitude;8 9 (2) words that impute a loathsome disease; 90 (3) words that ascribe an inability to perform
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see also Bryson v. News America

1996).
Pub'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Ill.
87. Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ill. 1992).
88. Id. Further distinguishing defamatory per se and defamatory per quod statements
is the type of damages that must be proven. With defamatory per se statements, a plaintiff
is not required to show special harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (1977).
Under a defamatory per quod theory, however, a showing of special harm is required. Id.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977). Under this form of defamation,
'one who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct constituting a criminal offense is subject to liability ...if committed in the place of publication, would be (a) punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution, or (b) regarded by public opinion as
involving moral turpitude." Id. The Restatement defines "moral turpitude" as "inherent
baseness or vileness of principle in the human heart ... in general, shameful wickedness,
so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honesty, good moral, justice or ethics as
to be shocking to the moral sense of community." Id. at cmt. g. As to the actionability of the
words, the defamatory language only needs to impute a criminal offense. Id. at cmt. c.
However, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the there is a criminal intention or design,
without also charging a criminal act. Id. A good illustration of this category of defamation
is found in Schnupp v.Smith, 457 S.E.2d 42 (Va. 1995). In Schnupp, the defendant, a police
officer, saw the plaintiff stop a company owned van in a high drug area where he witnessed
a passenger of the van and a man from the street exchange money and some white rocks.
Id. at 44. The defendant ordered another police unit to stop the van and search the vehicle.
Id. The defendant did not participate in the search, which yielded no drugs or paraphernalia. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 572 (1977).
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one's business, trade, or professional duties, including lack of ability; 9 1
92
and (4) words that impute serious sexual misconduct.
As to the second element, publication occurs when the defamatory
matter is negligently or intentionally communicated to a person other
than the person being defamed, i.e. a third party. 93 The communication
can be either by spoken word or gesture, in the case of slander, or by
printed word for libel. 94 In publishing the defamatory statement, the
95
third party recipient must "understand its defamatory significance."
While a defamatory statement must be published, there are occasions
where the publication will be either protected under the First Amendment or privileged. 9 6 The claimed privileges relevant to this case are
97
that the statements were either opinion or they were a "fair comment."
91.
92.
at 207.
93.
94.
95.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570, 574 (1977); see also Kolegas, 672 N.E.2d
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

577 (1977).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. a (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. c.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

563 (1977).
96. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (regarding First Amendment protection); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592A (1977) (covering absolute privileges); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-598A (1977) (covering conditional
privileges).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594, 598 (1997). Two other privileges are
also relevant to the facts in the case but are not issues on appeal: protection of publisher's
interest and communication to one who may act in the public behalf. Id. Under the protection of publisher's interest privilege, a publication will be privileged "if the circumstances
induce a correct or reasonable belief that: (a) there is information that affects a sufficiently
important interest of the publisher, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory
matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 594 (1977). Under this privilege, a publisher can protect "any lawful pecuniary
interest," including "land, chattel, and intangible things." Id. at cmt. f. In this case, Haul
n' Ride was protecting both intangible assets (business reputation) and its property (the
truck), and Babazork may have had knowledge of Alazork's location, which could have
helped Haul 'n Ride protect its interests. The public interest privilege differs in that statements are privileged "if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a)
there is information that affects a sufficiently important public interest, and (b) the public
interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or a private citizen who is authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory matter is true."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598 (1977). The public interest applies whenever "any
recognized interest of the public is in danger," such as the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals. Id. at cmt. Furthermore, this privilege is not limited to publication to public officials or law enforcement officers, but can include publication to private
citizens, which, if the statement were true, would give the recipient "a privilege to act for
the purpose of preventing a crime or of apprehending a criminal or fugitive from justice."
Id. at cmt. f. In this case, the statement concerning Alazork being involved in a terrorist
plot involved an issue of public concern, however, it is not clear whether the publication to
Babazork was allowable as Babazork was not authorized to act.
TORTS §
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Statements of Opinion98

Prior to 1990, statements of opinion were assumed to be protected
under the First Amendment against claims for defamation. 9 9 The rationale for this assumption was based on dicta in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 10 0
where the majority stated that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscious of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas." 1° 1 However, in Milkovich Lorain Journal Co, 10 2 the U.S. Supreme Court found that the courts were misapplying Gertz and held that there is no special privilege for "opinions" such
that a publisher would not be held liable.' 0 3 Instead, the Court determined that only those statements which "cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts" are protected under the First
Amendment."1 0 4 The distinction between whether a statement is an as98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §566 cmt. b (1977). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS and most states' common law distinguished between "pure" opinion and "mixed
type" opinions. Id. A "pure" opinion was one where the publisher stated the facts that
underlie the opinion. Id. For example, "I think he is an alcoholic because he has a beer
every day" is a pure opinion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 4 (1977). A
"mixed type" opinion is where the publisher states an opinion that is "apparently based on
facts... that have not been stated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, cmt. " For
example, "I think he is an alcoholic" would be actionable because the basis of the opinion
were not disclosed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, illus. 3 (1977).
99. See, e.g., Owen v. Carr,497 N.E.2d.1145 (Ill. 1986); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970
(C.D.A.C.1984).
100. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
101. Id. at 339-340.
102. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
103. Id. at 21. Thus, the use of terms such as "I think" or "in my opinion" would not
allow a publisher to escape liability. Id. at 18 (citing Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,
F.2d 54, 64 (2d. Cir. 1980)).
104. Kolegas, 672 N.E.2d at 208 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 at 20). As interpreted by
other courts, "the question of whether a statement of opinion is actionable as defamation is
one of degrees; the vaguer and more generalized the opinion, the more likely the opinion is
nonactionable as a matter of law." Wynne v. Loyola University of Chicago, 741 N.E.2d 669,
676 (Ill. 2000). For example, in Sullivan v. Conway, the defendant stated that the plaintiff,
an attorney, was a "very poor lawyer." Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1097 (7th Cir.
1998). The court found that this type of statement was not actionable under defamation
law because it was not objectionably verifiable because:
[legal representation is attended by a great deal of uncertainty. Excellent lawyers
may lose most of their cases because they are hired only in the most difficult ones,
while poor lawyers may win cases because they turn away all the ones that would
challenge their meager abilities. Many lawyers are good at some things and poor
at others ... so that the evaluation of them will depend on what the evaluator is
interested in. It would be unmanageable to ask a court, in order to determine the
validity of the defendants' defense of truth, to determine whether 'in fact' Sullivan
is a poor lawyer.
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sertion of fact or is opinion is a question of law. 10 5 In determining
whether a statement constitutes an opinion or an assertion of fact:
[a] court must examine the statement in its totality in the context in
which it was uttered or published. The court must consider all the
words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the
court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement. Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the
statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is published. 106
2.

Fair Comment Privilege

"Fair comment" is a common law affirmative defense or privilege to
defamation.107 Originally, the privilege only applied to statements of
"pure opinion."' 0 8 However, due to the dicta found in the Gertz decision
whereby statements of "pure opinion" were found not to be actionable by
state courts, the privilege was rendered of only historical value. 10 9
Under the Restatement's approach, only opinions that "impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis of the opinion" are
actionable. However, the Supreme Court in Milkovich limited the Gertz
decision and found that there was no special protection for opinions. 110
The basis for the Court's decision was that it did not need to carve out
another protection, such as the "fair comment" privilege. 1 1 ' State courts
1 12
have continued to analyze and apply this privilege.
The purpose of the "fair comment" privilege is to encourage "valuable public debate" in order to advance the discussion of public affairs and
public interests. 1 13 Under this speech-protective privilege, an action for
defamation will not lie when the statement: (1) deals with a matter of
public concern; (2) is based on true or privileged facts; and (3) represents
the actual opinion of the speaker, but is not made for the sole purpose of
causing harm. 1 14 Whether a statement involves a matter of public inter105. Protective FactorsInc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 2002 WL 1477174, at *3 (D. Mass.
2002).
106. Id.
107. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 566, cmts. a-b (1977).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 566, cmts. a-c (1977); Lee S. Kreindler, Blanca
I. Rodriguez, David Beekman, David C. Cook, 14 N.Y. Prac. New York Law of Torts § 1:48
(July 2002).
110. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
111. Id. at 21.
112. See, e.g., Myers v. The Telegraph, 773 N.E.2d 192, 2002 (Ill. 2002); Misek-Falkoff v.
McDonald, 177 F. Supp. 2d 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d
128 (Okla. 1998).
113. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13.
114. Id. at 13-14; see also Gaylord Entm't Co., 958 P.2d 128, 145 n. 62 (Okla. 1998).
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est is "determined by [the statement's] content, form and context." 1 15
Moreover, this privilege applies only to expressions of opinion and not to
false statements of facts. 1 16 Thus, if a statement of opinion "implies a
knowledge of facts which may lead to a defamatory conclusion, the im117
plied facts must themselves be true."
Alazork will likely argue that the trial court erred in finding that an
opinion can be defamatory as a matter of law. Instead, Alazork will argue that it is objectively possible to determine whether he was a terrorist
and this should have been submitted to the jury. For example, evidence
that Alazork had no contact with known or suspected terrorists would
verify that he was not a terrorist. Other indicia could also be found to
verify this point such that the issue should have gone to the jury. As to
the "fair comment" privilege, Alazork will likely argue that the comments were made to cause harm to himself, as the true intent of the
comments were to recover Haul n' Ride's truck, which is not a matter of
public concern.
Haul n' Ride will likely counter that his statement that Alazork
"might be involved [in a terrorist plot] or in trouble" cannot be objectively
verified and thus was protected by the First Amendment. It will likely
point out that when examining the entire statement, that Streeter was
using qualifying terms, in particular that Alazork, "might be involved."
Moreover, as to the "fair comment" privilege, Haul n' Ride will likely argue that the comments dealt with preventing a possible terrorist attack
which is a matter of public concern. Furthermore, his opinion was based
on true facts such as where the van was located, the ethnicity of Alazork,
and that there were reports of terrorist activity, and the statements were
not made for the purpose of causing harm to Alazork but to prevent the
harm of others.
Finally, Haul n' Ride may attempt to argue that Streeter's statements were privileged in other ways, such as trying protect a sufficiently
important interest of Haul n' Ride or that the comments were made in
the public's interest. Neither of these arguments should be considered
because they were not a part of the Order Granting Leave to Appeal.
D.

DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

Every state in this country has enacted a deceptive trade practice or
consumer protection statute. Although these statutes vary from state to
state and may be modeled after federal acts, they all have the same basic
purpose: to protect the public from unfair or deceptive acts or practices
115. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 566 cmt. (1977).
117. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802 (Cal. 1999).
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with respect to the sale of goods or services. The application of these
statutes to the service industries produced the mixed results among the
states.
The Deceptive Business Practices Act ("DBPA") provides a means for
recovery against companies for unfair business practices. Under the
DBPA, unfair or deceptive business practices are unlawful. Either the
State Attorney General or private individuals may bring a Deceptive
Business Practices suit against a business that employs unfair or deceptive practices to enjoin the business from further unfair practices and to
recover damages from the business.
1.

The State of MarshallDeceptive Business PracticesAct

Recognizing the importance of protecting the public from exploitation of unfair or deceptive practices, the State of Marshall has enacted
the DBPA. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Unfair deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use
or employment of any deception fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful if, in fact, a reasonable person
could be misled, deceived or damaged by said representations. 118
The DBPA has been liberally interpreted by courts to give effect to
the legislative goals behind the enactment. 1 19 More specifically, the
DBPA is a policy that gives consumers broader protection than common
law fraud or negligent misrepresentation by prohibiting any "deception,
fraud, false material fact, with intent that others rely upon concealment
in the conduct of any trade or commerce."120
In order to recover under the DBPA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a
statement by seller; (2) was of an existing or future material fact; (3) that
was untrue, without regard to the seller's knowledge or lack thereof of
such untruth; (4) made for the purpose of inducing reliance; (5) on which
1 21
plaintiff relies; and (6) which resulted in damages to the plaintiff.
Significantly, the DBPA does not require actual reliance. 12 2 As elsewhere, the application of this statute to the service industries, rather
than manufacturers, has produced mixed results in the State of
Marshall.
Most deceptive practices claims involve affirmative misrepresentations. For these claims, courts agree that the DBPA eliminates certain
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 505 MRC 815/2.
Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac. Co., 574 N.E.2d 760, 764 (1991).
Id.
Malooley v. Alice, 621 N.E.2d 265, 268 (111. App. 3d Dist. 1993).
Id.; see also Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., Inc. 607 N.E.2d 194, 194 n. 2 (Ill. 1992).
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elements of common law fraud as "many of the elements of common law
fraud have been eliminated . . .therefore, this statute affords broader
consumer protection than the common-law action of fraud by prohibiting
any deception or false promise." 1 23 In comparing the requisite elements
under the DBPA to those of common law fraud, it becomes clear that so
long as the alleged deception occurred in a course of conduct involving
trade or commerce, facts satisfying a claim for common law fraud will
necessarily satisfy a claim under the DBPA. 12 4 It becomes also clear
that that "good or bad faith of the seller is irrelevant, consequently, a
1 25
plaintiff can recover for even innocent misrepresentations."
a.

The PlaintiffMust Establish Reasonable Reliance

In order to establish a cause of action under the DBPA, a plaintiff
must prove reliance if he alleges that the defendant concealed or omitted
a material fact. Under the Act, if liability is based upon the defendant's
"concealment, suppression or omission" of material fact the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted "with intent that others rely upon
the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact."1 26 Circumstantial evidence can be used to prove intent.
For example, in Elipas Enters., Inc. v. Silverstein,12 7 the court held
that plaintiffs' complaint did not state a claim because the plaintiff did
not allege reasonable reliance. The court opined that a private person
seeking recovery under the Act must establish reasonable reliance.128 In
rendering its decision, the Elipas court distinguished Siegel v. Levy Org.
Dev. Co. 129 on the ground that the Act allows the Attorney General to file
enforcement suits without having to prove reasonable reliance. 130 Because the plaintiffs in Elipas were private individuals, they were re13 1
quired to prove reasonable reliance in order to state a cause of action.
Similarly in Martin v. Heingold Commodities, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that that they were defrauded when the defendant misrepresented
the nature of a "foreign service fee" in the sale of commodities to the
plaintiffs. 132 The Illinois Supreme Court, following federal securities
cases, held that plaintiffs were required to prove transaction causation
App.
123. See generally Ciampi v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 448 (Ill.
2d Dist. 1994).
124. See Siegel, 607 N.E.2d at 198.
125. Id.
126. MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 505 MRC 815/2.
App. 3d Dist. 1993).
127. 612 N.E.2d 9 (Ill.
128. Elipas, 612 N.E.2d at 12.
1992).
129. 607 N.E.2d 194 (Ill.
130. Elipas, 612 N.E.2d at 12.
131. Id.
1994).
132. 643 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ill.
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and loss causation.1 33 According to the court, "transaction causation"
meant that "the investor would not have engaged in the transaction had
the other party made truthful statements at the time required." 13 4 Further, "loss causation" signified that "the investor would not have suffered
a loss if the facts were what he believed them to be."1

35

In essence, the

court viewed this as reasonable reliance.
b. PlaintiffCan Also Allege Material Fact To State A Cause Of Action
Nevertheless, courts do not agree on whether a plaintiff must prove
reliance or materiality to recover on a misrepresentation claim. One
court recently held that in order to recover under the DBPA, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) a statement by seller; (2) was of an existing or future
material fact; (3) that was untrue, without regard to the seller's knowledge or lack thereof of such untruth; (4) made for the purpose of inducing
reliance; (5) on which plaintiff relies; and (6) which resulted in damages
136
to the plaintiff.
Alternatively, other cases dispute the reliance requirement. In Illinois, the First Appellate District explained that a plaintiff "need not
show actual reliance nor diligence in ascertaining the accuracy of the
misstatements." 137 However, the Appellate District Courts remain split
in Illinois, as the Second and Third Districts have held that a plaintiff
138
must prove reasonable reliance.
2. Alazork's Anticipated Argument
Alazork will first argue that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the summary judgment on the alleged violation of the DBPA.
More specifically, Alazork will contend that Haul n' Ride intended to create reliance on his part. Applying these cases to the facts, Alazork will
no doubt claim that Haul n' Ride concealed or omitted a material fact by
failing to inform him of the additional charges that would be levied if the
truck left the State of Marshall. Relying on the holding in Heingold,
133. Id. at 750.
134. Id.; see also LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peadbody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir.
1988).
135. Id.
136. Malooley v. Alice, 621 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1993).
137. Harkala v. Wildwood Realty, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1990).
138. Borcherding v. Anderson Remodeling Co., 624 N.E.2d 887, 892 (Ill. App. 2d Dist.
1993), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 1994); see also Roche v. FiresideChrysler-Plymouth
Mazda, Inc. 600 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1992). Ultimately, reasonable reliance is required and will take precedence over materiality. Bercoon, Weiner, Glick and
Brook v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 818 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Ciampi v.
Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 634 N.E.2d 448, 460 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1994); 815 ILCS
§505/2 (1993).
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Alazork will argue that he would not have entered into the rental agreement had he know of the additional fees had Haul n' Ride disclosed such
facts in the contract. Because the rental agreement was silent as to the
use of GPS technology in the tracking of the rental truck, Alazork will
argue that he should not have to pay the additional charges for taking
the truck across state lines.
Alazork will further argue that the use of the GPS technology was
known to Streeter at the time of the rental and the use of such technology was implemented to determine rental charges. Therefore, the use of
such technology was a material fact to the contract that was never disclosed to Alazork.
3. Haul n' Ride's Anticipated Argument
Haul n' Ride, however, will most likely respond by arguing that summary judgment should be affirmed because Alazork cannot allege reasonable reliance. Relying on Elipas Enters, Inc. v. Silverstein,139 Haul n'
Ride will argue that a private person must establish reasonable reliance
in order to seek recovery under a deceptive practice action. Haul n' Ride
will contend that it was not bound by the rental agreement to notify, and
thus reasonable reliance cannot be demonstrated. Because Alazork cannot establish reasonable reliance, Haul n' Ride will further argue that
the material facts are not in dispute. Hence, the decision by the Court of
Appeals granting summary judgment to Haul n' Ride should be affirmed.

139. 612 N.E.2d 9 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1993).
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APPENDIX A
MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 505

MRC 815/2:

Unfair deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the
use or employment of any deception fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful if, in fact, a reasonable person
could be misled, deceived or damaged by said representations.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

WHETHER THE USE OF

GPS

SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY BY A VEHICLE

RENTAL COMPANY TO GATHER PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT ITS CUSTOMERS' LOCATION CONSTITUTES AN INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION.

II.

WHETHER A STATEMENT, PHRASED AS AN OPINION, THAT IMPLIES A
FALSE ASSERTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OR OTHER WRONGDOING, IS
PROTECTED OPINION OR FAIR COMMENT.

III.

WHETHER THE USE OF

GPS

SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY BY A VEHICLE

RENTAL COMPANY FOR NON-EMERGENCY PURPOSES CONSTITUTES AN
UNFAIR DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE WHERE THE RENTAL AGREEMENT LIMITS THE SCOPE OF

GPS

TO EMERGENCY LOCATION SERVICES.
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BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL:

Petitioner, Robert Alazork, respectfully submits this brief in support
of his request for reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals below.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and order of the Potter County Circuit Court is unreported. The opinion and order of the First District Court of Appeals of
the State of Marshall is also unreported and is set out in the record. (R.
at 1-11.)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with Section
1020(2) of the Rules for the Twenty-First Annual John Marshall Law
School Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy
Law.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the following statutory provisions: MARSHALL RE505 MRC 815/2; MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 735 MRC 15/30;
MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 735 MRC 15/40.

VISED CODE,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Prior to the fall of 2000, twenty year-old Robert Alazork, a United
States citizen of Zorkesian descent, was a student at Capitol College recognized for his academic excellence. (R. at 6.) Mr. Alazork served as a
spokesperson for the Zorkesian-American Society of Marshall ("Society")
and spent the summer of 2000 working with underprivileged children.
(R. at 2-3.) When Mr. Alazork arrived at school at the beginning of the
2000 fall semester, he learned that his scholarship had been revoked and
that he would have to pay the full tuition and room and board for the
semester prior to starting classes. (R. at 6.) Unable to do so, Mr. Alazork
was forced to quit college. (R. at 7.) On the second day of classes, September 10, Capitol College Gazette, read by nearly all 1500 students, ran
a front-page story about his scholarship being revoked. (R. at 7.)
Mr. Alazork contacted his benefactor, Tom Babazork, who sponsored
the award on behalf of the Society, about the revocation of his scholarship. (R. at 6.) Babazork informed him that a rental truck company,
Haul n' Ride, had informed him that Mr. Alazork was suspected of terrorist activity, and had been spotted at an adult bookstore. (R. at 6.)
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Babazork told Mr. Alazork that the Society could not afford such publicity and thus was forced to revoke his scholarship. (R. at 6.)
Mr. Alazork, when moving back to school at the end of the summer,
rented a truck from Haul n' Ride to move his belongings from his parents' home in Smallville, Marshall, to his off-campus apartment at Capitol College in Capitol City, West Ducoda, which was thirty miles away.
(R. at 3.) Initially, Mr. Alazork called Haul n' Ride's national toll-free
number to gather information on renting a truck for his move. (R. at 3.)
Via the national number, he was automatically connected to Haul n'
Ride's Smallville location. (R. at 3.) Mr. Alazork spoke with Haul n'
Ride's Smallville rental agency manager, John Streeter. (R. at 3.) Mr.
Streeter explained that the company offered two types of rentals, "local"
and "one-way." (R. at 3.) He told Mr. Alazork that local rentals involved
the truck being returned to the same Haul n' Ride location that it was
rented from, whereas one-way rentals allowed the truck to be returned to
a different Haul n' Ride location. (R. at 3.) He further explained that
one-way rentals were more expensive than local rentals as they necessitated the maintenance of national locations to which the trucks could be
returned. (R. at 3.) Mr. Alazork, renting from the Smallville location to
which he would eventually return the truck, reserved a truck for a "local"
move. (R. at 3.)
Unknown to Mr. Alazork, Haul n' Ride had an anti-terrorism policy
which stated that Zorkesian renters were suspicious and recommended
that Zorkesian renters be scrutinized more than other customers. (R. at
4.) Because he was Zorkesian and thus automatically a suspected terrorist according to Haul n' Ride's policy, in order to rent a truck Mr. Alazork
had to provide his name, current and past addresses, present and former
telephone numbers, mobile and work phone, three financial references,
and three personal references. (R. at 4.) Mr. Alazork complied with the
requests, and listed his benefactor, Tom Babazork, as both a financial
and personal reference. (R. at 4.) Mr. Alazork also informed Mr.
Streeter that he would be using the truck to move back to his university
for the fall semester. (R. at 4-5.)
On August 22, Mr. Alazork arrived at his apartment, approximately
two blocks from the Capitol College campus. (R. at 5.) As he did not
finish unloading the truck until 6 p.m., Mr. Alazork decided to park the
truck overnight and return it to the Smallville Haul n' Ride early the
next morning. (R. at 5.) Since he was prohibited by municipal rules from
parking on the street overnight, Mr. Alazork parked the truck in a convenience store mall parking lot across the street. (R. at 5.) The mall had a
convenience store, a dry-cleaner, and an adult bookstore. (R. at 5.)
Also unknown to Mr. Alazork, his rental truck was equipped with
global positioning system technology ("GPS"). (R. at 4.) GPS employs a
network of satellites and ground stations that continuously transmit
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data over radio frequencies, along with devices that receive these transmissions and use them to calculate their own location via a method
known as triangulation. (R. at 3.) It recorded the precise distance and
route that each truck took, and enabled Haul n' Ride to determine the
exact location of any of its GPS-equipped vehicles at any given time. (R.
at 4-5.) The rental agreement stated that GPS might be used for emergency location services; however, no other mention of GPS was made in
the rental agreement. (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) The GPS device was located in the truck's engine compartment. (R. at 4.) On August 23, Mr. Streeter received a notice from the Haul n' Ride corporate
office alerting him to a possible terrorist threat wherein a Haul n' Ride
truck might be used to carry explosives into Capitol City. (R. at 5.) Mr.
Streeter promptly used GPS to determine the location of all Haul n'
Ride's trucks being currently rented. (R. at 5.) Accordingly, Mr. Streeter
discovered that Mr. Alazork's truck was in Capitol City. (R. at 5.) He
ran the GPS address through a reverse directory on the Internet and
identified the address as that of an adult bookstore. (R. at 5.) Learning
this, Mr. Streeter began contacting Mr. Alazork's references, and he first
called Mr. Alazork's benefactor, Tom Babazork. (R. at 5.)
Mr. Streeter told Babazork that he had learned that Mr. Alazork
had taken a Haul n' Ride truck out of Marshall and parked it at an adult
bookstore. (R. at 5-6.) He told Babazork about the suspected terrorist
activity, and said that he was worried that Mr. Alazork "might be involved or in trouble." (R. at 5-6.) Further, although Babazork made no
attempt to verify the accuracy of Mr. Streeter's statements, fearful of the
Society being associated with terrorist activity, Babazork cancelled Mr.
Alazork's scholarship. (R. at 6.)
After eventually gleaning this information from Babazork, Mr.
Alazork contacted Haul n' Ride to try to determine what had happened
that would lead Haul n' Ride to tell his benefactor that he was a suspected terrorist and adult-bookstore patron. (R. at 6.) When he spoke
with Mr. Streeter, the manager informed him that because he took the
truck across state lines, his credit card had been charged for the "oneway" rental at a rate of $1900, rather than the local rate of $324 he had
been quoted at the time he rented the truck. (R. at 6.)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Alazork sued Haul n' Ride in Potter County Circuit Court, State
of Marshall, alleging the following: (1) that Haul n' Ride intruded upon
his seclusion by using global positioning technology in its rental vehicles;
(2) that Mr. Streeter's comments were defamatory; and (3) that Haul n'
Ride violated the Deceptive Business Practice Act. (R. at 7). Neither
Alazork nor Haul n' Ride dispute the facts as they are reported in the
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record below. (R. at 2.) The Potter County Court granted summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride. (R. at 1.)
Mr. Alazork appealed the Potter County decision to the First District Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall. (R. at 1.) The court of
appeals held that Mr. Alazork did not meet the elements of the State of
Marshall's statute governing claims for intrusion upon seclusion. (R. at
7.) The court held that the use of GPS did not constitute an intrusion
upon seclusion. (R. at 7.) According to the court, there was no evidence
that the information collected was private. (R. at 7.) Finally, the court
found that there was no indication that the use of GPS was highly offensive to a reasonable person. (R. at 7.)
The court also rejected Mr. Alazork's defamation claim, holding that
Mr. Streeter's comments were either opinion or fair comment. (R. at 8.)
Finally, the court rejected Mr. Alazork's Deceptive Business Practices
Act claim. (R. at 9.) The court held that neither the failure to disclose
the exorbitant out-of-state charge, nor the failure to disclose use of the
GPS technology were material facts such that nondisclosure would constitute a violation of the Deceptive Business Practice Act. (R. at 9.) The
court ultimately affirmed the Potter County Circuit Court's award of
summary judgment. (R. at 10.) It is from this decision that Mr. Alazork
appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
Technology should not render privacy law obsolete. The advances in
technology have increased dramatically over the past century, yet longestablished privacy laws are flexible enough to keep up with technology's
encroachment on personal privacy. GPS can save lives and generally be
a benefit to society; however, in order for GPS to have a positive societal
impact, average consumers must have faith that companies will not use
GPS to pry into their private affairs. Therefore, the increase in technology demands an increase in privacy protection.
Haul n' Ride invaded Mr. Alazork's privacy by intruding upon his
seclusion when it utilized GPS to pry into his private affairs. Two separate intrusions are present. First, without proper authority, Haul n'
Ride's use of GPS to electronically spy on Mr. Alazork constituted an unauthorized intrusion into Mr. Alazork's zone of sensory privacy. Second,
an intrusion occurred when Haul n' Ride accessed data from GPS without permission for the purpose of disclosing private and embarrassing
facts about Mr. Alazork to others. Technology has distorted the line between what is private and what is public, and Mr. Alazork was not required to have an expectation of complete privacy concerning the location
of his rental truck, even though it was in public. Thus, Mr. Alazork rea-
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sonably expected that GPS would not be used to pry into his private affairs. Further, the unauthorized use of GPS to pry into Mr. Alazork's
personal affairs would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore, Mr. Alazork has presented genuine issues of material fact with regards to the elements of intrusion upon seclusion, precluding summary
judgment.
II.
Defamation law does not allow a speaker to damage a person's reputation without consequence merely because the speaker phrases his comment in the form of opinion. To that end, the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech does not provide a per se exemption for statements of opinion. Rather, where a statement of opinion implies an assertion of objective fact, that statement will be actionable. Haul n' Ride
defamed Mr. Alazork when its agent, Streeter, falsely accused Mr.
Alazork of being a terrorist and a frequenter of adult bookstores. Although Streeter phrased his comment in the form of an opinion, his
statements implied that Mr. Alazork was indeed a terrorist and a frequenter of adult bookstores. The First Amendment simply does not protect such malicious speech. Further, Haul n' Ride cannot hide behind the
fair comment privilege. The fair comment privilege only applies to statements that are incapable of being proven true or false; therefore an accusation of criminal activity falls outside of the scope of the fair comment
privilege. Further, a false accusation of criminal conduct cannot be considered a comment for the purpose of the fair comment privilege because
such accusations have no redeeming social value. Therefore, neither the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech nor the fair comment privilege shield Haul n' Ride from liability for Streeter's defamatory remark.
Therefore, summary judgment on the defamation issue was improper.
III.
Further, the failure to fully disclose the various ways that GPS
would be used against Mr. Alazork constituted an unfair deceptive business practice. The growth of GPS in rental vehicles has brought with it
new and inventive ways to deceive unsuspecting consumers like Mr.
Alazork. Mr. Alazork rented his vehicle with the assurance from Haul n'
Ride that its rental vehicles would be equipped with GPS in case of an
emergency only. Haul n' Ride capitalized on Mr. Alazork's naivety by
charging him an exorbitant fee for breaking a minor contractual provision and disclosing personal information recorded by GPS to the Society.
Under Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act, the omission of a
material fact in the conduct of any trade or business constitutes a deceptive unfair practice. Summary judgment was improper because the
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question of materiality is a question of fact that should, in all but the
most extreme cases, be decided by the trier of fact. Various aspects of the
transaction raise serious questions concerning materiality. Haul n'
Ride's use of GPS was no more than a hidden charge in the rental agreement, and the failure to disclose its secret pecuniary interest in GPS was
material. Haul n' Ride obscured the total amount of the fee and its
method of discovery via GPS, thereby materially misrepresenting the actual fee charged to the customer. Haul n' Ride's failure to notify Mr.
Alazork that information gathered via GPS would be disclosed the third
persons also constitutes a material omission of fact.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. HAUL N' RIDE'S UNAUTHORIZED USE OF GPS TO
UNREASONABLY OBSERVE AND SCRUTINIZE MR. ALAZORK'S
PRIVATE AFFAIRS CONSTITUTES AN INVASION OF PRIVACY BY
INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION.
Concerned with the blossoming age of technology, Justices Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis exclaimed in their famous law review
article:
The intensity and complexity of life . have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world .. .so that solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention
have, through invasions upon privacy, subjected [man] to mental pain
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193, 196 (1890). Although written in the nineteenth century, Justices Warren and Brandeis could have been referring to GPS when they
warned future generations "numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction [that] 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the housetops.'" Id. at 195. There is no question GPS,
when used properly, can be beneficial to society; however, in the absence
of any meaningful state or federal legislation restricting its use, GPS
threatens to allow meddlesome businesses, like Haul n' Ride, to intrude
into the private affairs of the individual. See M.J. Zuckerman, Wireless,
with Strings Attached: A Cell Phone Can Make You Stand Out, to Rescuers and Marketers Alike, USA Today, Feb. 7, 2002, at 1D.
The right to privacy has been described as "the rightful claim of the
individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself
with others." Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy 1 (1970).
Webster's states information is private if it is "intended for or restricted
to the use of a particular person or group or class of persons: not freely
available to the public." See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1989) (quoting
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Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary 1804 (1976)). The Orwellian aspect of GPS provides businesses ubiquitous access to the individual and robs him of the ability to control the flow of private information
concerning his location. Such control robs the individual of his dignity
and violates his right to privacy.
The State of Marshall recognizes the common-law tort of intrusion

upon seclusion as embodied in the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SEC-

652B (1977). The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is defined as an
intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another person, or upon his private affairs or concerns. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). One is subject to liability to
another for invasion of privacy if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Id. As the following sections will illustrate, the
plaintiff must first show an unauthorized penetration of a zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding him. Shulman v. Group W Prods.,
Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998). An unwarranted examination of personal data also constitutes an intrusion. Id. Next, the plaintiff must
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place, information, or
conversation. Id. Last, the plaintiff must show that the intrusion is
TION

highly offensive to a reasonable person. See
TORTS § 652B (1977).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

This Court reviews de novo the decision of the court of appeals. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). All facts and inferences are
taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Mr. Alazork, and
summary judgment should only be given in the unlikely event that there
are no genuine issues of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Therefore, if Mr. Alazork presents more than a
scintilla of evidence concerning the material facts in dispute, then summary judgment is improper. Id. Further, the burden is on the movant,
Haul n' Ride, to prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the
non-movant's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. For the reasons set forth
below, Mr. Alazork has presented several genuine issues of material fact.
Therefore, the court of appeals' decision affirming the summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride should be reversed, and the case should be
remanded for a trial on the merits.
A.

THE

USE OF

GPS

TO PRY INTO THE PERSONAL AFFAIRS OF

MR.

ALAZORK CONSTITUTES AN INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION.

For an intrusion to be actionable, Mr. Alazork first must show that
"the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy ... or
obtained unwanted access to data about the plaintiff." Shulman, 955
P.2d at 490. The invasion of privacy can be accomplished by a physical
intrusion into a place of seclusion, such as a physical invasion of the
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plaintiffs home. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. v. Am. Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1998). Or an intrusion can occur via the use of one's
senses, with or without the use of mechanical aids, to pry into the plaintiffs private affairs, such as when a person uses binoculars to peer into
another's home. Id. Further, an intrusion can occur where the defendant engages in some form of investigation in order to learn private information about the plaintiff, such as when a person examines another's
bank account without authorization. Id. In the present case, Mr.
Alazork has presented genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether Haul n' Ride committed a sensory intrusion into his zone of privacy when it employed GPS to engage in high-tech espionage. Further,
Mr. Alazork has presented genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether Haul n' Ride committed an actionable intrusion by obtaining
unwanted access to information about Mr. Alazork.
1.

The use of GPS constitutes a sensory invasion of Mr. Alazork's zone
of privacy.

GPS is an example of a "mechanical device" that threatens to invade
a person's privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890). The types of devices
capable of secretly recording and transmitting personal information
about a person have dramatically escalated in recent years. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473. GPS, used improperly, allows a person to exercise
a great deal of control over another because of its omnipresence. The
control exercised over the person robs him of his dignity and invades his
privacy; consequently, the proliferation of GPS necessitates an increase
in privacy protection.
As a general rule, the mere observation of a person's public activities
is not an intrusion upon seclusion. See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1969). However, the general rule does not mean
that everything occurring in public is fair game for inquiry. Id. Rather,
when the sensory observation of a person's activities in public is overzealous, then such an observation can be an actionable intrusion. See id.
Here, Haul n' Ride's unreasonable use of GPS, which provided ever-present access to private information about Mr. Alazork, amounts to overzealous public observation and is thus actionable.
In Nader, a well-known consumer advocate brought an action for invasion of privacy against General Motors ("GM") alleging GM authorized
its agents to engage in activities that invaded his privacy. Id. at 767.
Mr. Nader alleged GM agents followed him into a bank and got sufficiently close "to see the denominations of the bills he was withdrawing
from his account." Id. at 771. The Court of Appeals of New York acknowledged the general rule that mere observation of the plaintiff in a
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public place does not constitute an actionable intrusion upon seclusion.
Id. However, the court stated, "A person does not automatically make
public everything he does merely by being in a public place." Id. To that
end, the court found that the shadowing of Mr. Nader by GM's agents
was more than mere observation. Id. The court held overzealous public
surveillance is an actionable intrusion. Id. The unreasonable proximity
to Mr. Nader constituted the overzealous act. See also Pinkerton Nat'l
Detective Agency v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119, 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963)
(holding constant public surveillance constitutes an actionable intrusion); Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687
(Iowa 1987) (stating that public observation can amount to an invasion,
particularly when plaintiff requests privacy). Consequently, Mr. Nader's
intrusion claim was not insufficient as a matter of law merely because he
was in a public location. Nader, 225 N.E.2d at 771.
As in the Nader case, Haul n' Ride's use of GPS constitutes an overzealous public observation of Mr. Alazork. In Nader, the court was concerned with the agent's unreasonable proximity to Mr. Nader. See id.
GPS provided Haul n' Ride around-the-clock access to Mr. Alazork's location. (R. at 4.) Mr. Alazork was helpless to defend against such monitoring. Haul n' Ride did not properly notify Mr. Alazork of the extent of the
use of GPS as evidenced by the rental agreement's description of GPS for
emergency location services. (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Mr.
Alazork was unaware that the truck was equipped with GPS as the device was concealed in the truck's engine compartment. (R. at 4.) Therefore, Haul n' Ride could surreptitiously monitor Mr. Alazork's location at
all times. Because Mr. Alazork could not escape from Haul n' Ride's constant monitoring, his situation is analogous to the GM agents' unreasonable proximity to Mr. Nader. Hence, GPS use, which provides Haul n'
Ride with all encompassing access to Mr. Alazork, is the overzealous act
that makes the public observation in this case an actionable intrusion.
See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1970).
Christopher is a trade secret appropriation case, but the case has
privacy implications that are applicable to the case at bar. Id. at 1013.
The defendants in Christopher were photographers hired to take aerial
photographs of construction occurring at a plant in Texas owned by duPont. Id. The plaintiff alleged the defendants wrongfully obtained photographs that revealed trade secrets owned by duPont and sold them to
third parties. Id. at 1014. Under Texas law, liability for disclosure of
trade secrets attaches if the trade secrets are obtained by "improper
means." Id. The defendants argued that the photographs were not obtained by improper means because all of the activities occurred in public
airspace and the trade secrets were exposed to public viewing via aircraft. Id. However, the Fifth Circuit found the photographers used im-
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proper means to discover the trade secrets. Id at 1016. The court noted
it would be unreasonable to require duPont to build an "impenetrable
fortress" to guard against such stealthy methods of observation. Id at
1016-17. The court stated, "[P]erhaps ordinary fences and roofs must be
built to shut out incursive eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of
a trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or
the unpreventable methods of espionage now available." Id. at 1016.
Likewise, this Court should not require Mr. Alazork to guard
against the undetectable high-tech espionage engaged in by Haul n'
Ride. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding the use of a shotgun microphone to decipher private conservations constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion). Mr. Alazork was only
"guilty" of parking his truck in a shopping center parking lot that happened to house an adult bookstore. (R. at 5.) As a consequence of Haul n'
Ride's high-tech espionage, Mr. Alazork lost his scholarship and consequently was forced to withdraw from the university. (R. at 6-7.) The
interest in individual privacy is just as important as the interest in protecting trade secrets. Therefore, it would be no less unreasonable to require Mr. Alazork to build an "impenetrable fortress" to guard against
the undetectable intrusion via GPS. See Christopher,431 F.2d at 101617. In the present case, the general rule that public observation of the
plaintiff is a non-actionable intrusion should give way because constant
GPS surveillance is unreasonable, and Mr. Alazork was helpless to
guard against such intrusive monitoring.
2.

The use of GPS to improperly collect and examine private
information about Mr. Alazork constitutes an actionable
intrusion.

Not only did the use of GPS constitute a sensory invasion of Mr.
Alazork's privacy, but Haul n' Ride's examination of private location information via GPS for improper purposes also constituted an intrusion
upon his seclusion. Probing into the private affairs of Mr. Alazork robs
him of the right to control the extent to which he wishes to divulge personal information about himself to others. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 1255 (1975)
("[T]he right of privacy is the right to control the flow of information concerning the details of one's individuality."). In such a situation, the examination alone is sufficient to create a claim for intrusion upon
seclusion. See Alexander v. FBI, 971 F. Supp. 603, 610 (D.D.C. 1997).
Publication of the information gathered is not an essential element of an
intrusion claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b. (1977).
Despite the fact that Haul n' Ride did disseminate the wrongfully gathered information, an intrusion upon seclusion occurred the moment Haul
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n' Ride utilized GPS to gather embarrassing private facts about Mr.
Alazork. See Alexander, 971 F. Supp. at 610.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently recognized that a request of FBI files for improper purposes is an
intrusion upon seclusion. Id. The Alexander case arose from what has
been popularly called "Filegate." Id. at 605. The plaintiffs, former Bush
and Reagan administration employees and appointees, sued former First
Lady Hillary Clinton and other White House personnel for intrusion
upon seclusion. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that making improper requests for their Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") files invaded
their privacy. Id. The defendants argued that no intrusion occurred because the FBI files were largely matters of public record. Id. Although
the files contained public information, the court found the plaintiffs
nonetheless had a privacy interest because the files could also contain
embarrassing private information about the plaintiffs. Id. at 609. The
court found the complaint valid because it alleged that the sole purpose
of the defendants' request was to "obtain embarrassing or damaging information on former employees . . .for partisan political purposes." Id.
Therefore, where the collection of information, regardless of its public
nature, is done merely for the purpose of exposing private and potentially embarrassing information about the plaintiff, an intrusion upon
seclusion has occurred. Id.
Alexander is analogous to the present case because Haul n' Ride's
motive for collecting information concerning Mr. Alazork's location was
to disclose personal information about him. According to the rental contract, GPS was to be used only for emergency location services. (See
Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Yet, upon learning the allegedly damning
information about Mr. Alazork, Streeter did not call a supervisor or any
law enforcement authority. (R. at 5.) Instead, he contacted Mr.
Alazork's references. (R. at 5.) Streeter first called Mr. Babazork, the
sponsor of Mr. Alazork's scholarship, and told him that Mr. Alazork was
parked in an adult bookstore and might be involved in terrorist activity.
(R. at 5-6.) Had this information been gathered for emergency location
services, Streeter would have immediately contacted the proper authorities instead of Mr. Alazork's peers. The dissemination of this information to Mr. Alazork's references is evidence of Haul n' Ride's motive to
embarrass Mr. Alazork. Haul n' Ride's motive is further evidenced by its
policy of targeting Zorkesians for heightened rental scrutiny. According
to Haul n' Ride's policy, renters of Zorkesian descent were automatically
suspect. (R. at 4.) As a Zorkesian, Mr. Alazork was, according to Haul n'
Ride's policy, a suspected terrorist. (R. at 4.) As such, even after disclosing extensive personal information prior to renting, Mr. Alazork was
monitored via GPS and information about his whereabouts was used to
embarrass him. Because the collection of information via GPS was solely
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to make personal disclosures about Mr. Alazork, then according to Alexander, Mr. Alazork has stated a valid cause of action for intrusion upon
seclusion. See 971 F. Supp. at 610. Therefore, there is a question of fact
concerning whether the collection of private information about Mr.
Alazork constituted an actionable intrusion upon seclusion. Next, for an
intrusion to be actionable, the plaintiff must not consent to the alleged
intrusion.
3.

The mention of GPS in the rental agreement did not vest Haul n'
Ride with the authority to pry into Mr. Alazork's private affairs.

Although Mr. Alazork signed a rental contract consenting to the possible use of GPS for emergency location services, Mr. Alazork did not
consent to the use of GPS for any other purpose. (See Rental Agreement,
Exhibit B.) Consequently, the GPS provision in the rental contract does
not absolve Haul n' Ride from liability for intrusion upon seclusion.
For an intrusion to be actionable, the plaintiff must not consent to
the challenged activity. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d
633, 648 (Cal. 1994). Consent for one purpose is not consent for all purposes. Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998). Whether a person voluntarily consents to particular conduct
turns on whether the challenged conduct has been fully disclosed to the
plaintiff. Norman-Bloodshaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260,
1270 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the limited consent to allow the use of GPS
for emergency location services did not vest Haul n' Ride with the authority to pry into the private affairs of Mr. Alazork. See id.
Ainsworth involved an appropriation of name and likeness claim,
and like intrusion upon seclusion, consent to the challenged conduct will
defeat the plaintiffs claim. 693 N.E.2d at 513. In Ainsworth, a worker
consented to being videotaped while installing ceramic tile for purposes
of the creation of an instructional video. Id. at 511-12. The company
making the video represented to the worker that the video would be distributed to customers of the company for instructional purposes only. Id.
at 512. Later, parts of the instructional video were used to make a television commercial. Id. The defendants argued the consent to appear in
the instructional video extended to the commercial use of the plaintiffs
likeness. Id. at 514. However, the court disagreed. Id. The court stated
the defendant's reasoning "amounts to an assertion that, by consenting
to eat apples with dinner, one has also consented to eat oranges. The
fact that both of them are fruit does not make them indistinguishable."
Id. Therefore, the consent for instructional purposes did not amount to
consent for purposes of making the commercial. Id.
Likewise, Mr. Alazork's consent to allow Haul n' Ride to utilize GPS
for emergency location purposes did not amount to consent to gather and
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disseminate private information about Mr. Alazork to third persons. The
rental agreement specifically states rental cars may be equipped with
GPS for "emergency location services." (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit
B.) Even if the events leading up to the activation of the GPS by the
Haul n' Ride employee did amount to an emergency, Mr. Alazork did not
authorize Haul n' Ride to gather and disseminate private information to
Mr. Babazork. See Ainsworth, 693 N.E.2d at 514.
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit held full disclosure is a necessary element of consent. Norman-Bloodshaw, 135 F.3d at 1270. The
plaintiffs in that case were new laboratory employees. Id. at 1264. They
were required to take a federally mandated entrance examination that
consisted of completion of detailed medical forms, a medical examination, and blood and urine testing. Id. However, the employer used the
blood and urine samples to test for sensitive medical conditions including
syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy. Id. The plaintiffs subsequently
sued the employer for invasion of privacy. Id. The employer argued it
fully informed the employees of the examination requirements, including
the requirement of giving blood and urine samples. Id. at 1270. Further,
the employer argued the completion of the medical history form, which
asked detailed personal questions, placed the employees on notice that
blood and urine samples would be used to test for venereal disease, sickle
cell trait, and pregnancy. Id. However, the court held the blood testing
was "qualitatively different" from providing answers to a questionnaire.
Id. ("[Consenting] to a general medical examination does not abolish
one's privacy right not to be tested for intimate, personal matters involving one's health-nor does consenting to blood and urine samples, or filling out a questionnaire.").
Mr. Alazork authorized Haul n' Ride to use GPS for emergency location services only. (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) The actual use of
GPS by Haul n' Ride to spy on Mr. Alazork is likewise "qualitatively different." The rental contract describes the use of GPS as a service. (See
Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Black's Law Dictionary defines service as
"[t]he act of doing something useful for a person or company for a fee."
Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (7th ed. 1999). The word service leads a
renter to believe GPS would be put to use for the benefit of the renter. In
reality, GPS was used against Mr. Alazork to pry into his private affairs.
Therefore, a genuine issue of fact exists concerning whether the contractual provision absolves Haul n' Ride from liability for an unauthorized
intrusion upon seclusion. Next, Mr. Alazork must show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning his location.
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PERSONAL AFFAIRS.

An intrusion upon seclusion is proven only if "the plaintiff had an
objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation, or data source." Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490. The recent
onslaught of sensory enhancement technology, like GPS, obscures the
distinction between what is public and what is private. Because of advancements in technology, "privacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is
not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic." Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999). Therefore, that "the privacy one expects in a
given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation
unreasonable as a matter of law." Id. The antiquated common-law notion that a man's home is his castle should be updated if it is going to
have any application in today's technological age. Therefore, this Court
should recognize, in certain circumstances, a person has an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in information concerning his location,
even in public.
Several Fourth Amendment cases illustrate the role sensory enhancement technology continues to play in defining society's expectation
of privacy. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens ... has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology....
The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power
of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."). Like intrusion upon seclusion, a person's capacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In
Kyllo, the Supreme Court expanded the realm of personal privacy by
holding the use of a thermal imaging device to determine the amount of
heat emanating from inside a home violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures. 533 U.S. at 34. Furthermore, in Katz, the Court found that placing a recording device on a
public telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had a reasonable expectation that his conversation would remain private, despite the fact that he was in public. 389 U.S. at 353.
While the Ninth Circuit has found the Fourth Amendment is not
violated when officers place GPS on a car to track its location, its reasoning is flawed because it places too much emphasis on the public location
of the car and not enough emphasis on the person. See United States v.
McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). The court held the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation in the undercarriage of his car. However, the court missed the point because "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (noting that whether a
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phone booth is a constitutionally protected area is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). Rather, the proper focus should be on
the individual's privacy rights in relation to the technology. Once this
approach is taken, it becomes evident Mr. Alazork had a reasonable expectation that certain information concerning his location would remain
private.
Mr. Alazork's situation is similar to the situation faced by the plaintiffs in Shulman, 955 P.2d at 474. In Shulman, vehicle accident victims
sued a television producer for intrusion upon seclusion after the producer filmed various aspects of the victims' rescue. Id. A cameraman
filmed the extrication from the car and the flight back to the hospital in a
medical helicopter. Id. Only one of the accident victims was transported
to the hospital via helicopter. Id. A flight crew nurse wore a microphone
that recorded that plaintiffs conversations with the nurse and others in
the helicopter. Id. The defendant argued the plaintiffs lacked a complete expectation of privacy because the accident occurred on a public
thoroughfare. Id. at 490-93. Further, the defendant asserted the plaintiff in the helicopter lacked an expectation of privacy in the life-flight
helicopter because many people were present and overheard the conversations between the nurse and the plaintiff. Id. The court agreed with
the defendant's assertion that observation on a public roadway is not an
actionable invasion of privacy. Id. As to the plaintiff whose conversation
was recorded in the helicopter, the court nevertheless held that her expectation of privacy, although not absolute, was reasonable. Id. Even
though various people were present and overheard her conversation, the
plaintiff possessed a reasonable expectation that a recording microphone
would not be used to document her conversations en route to the hospital. Id. Shulman focused on the use of the technology to define the expectation of privacy. Concerning the microphone, the court stated, "by
placing a microphone on [the nurse's] person, amplifying what she said
and heard, defendants may have listened in on conversations the parties
could reasonably have expected to be private." Id. According to the court,
the secret monitoring of the plaintiffs conversations with the
microphone denied the plaintiff an important aspect of privacy: the right
to control the flow of such information to third persons. Id. Therefore,
despite lacking an expectation of complete privacy, the plaintiffs expectation of privacy was reasonable. Id.
Just as the Shulman plaintiff lacked an expectation of complete privacy concerning her conversation, Mr. Alazork lacked an expectation of
complete privacy regarding his location. However, the lack of absolute
privacy is not dispositive. See, e.g., Sanders, 978 P.2d at 77 (holding television reporter who gained employment at a company and secretly videotaped conversations with co-workers committed an intrusion upon
seclusion despite the fact that other co-workers could overhear the con-
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versation); Stessman, 416 N.W.2d at 687 (stating plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a crowded restaurant despite it being open
to the public). While Mr. Alazork's truck was parked in a public location,
he nevertheless had a reasonable expectation that his movements were
not being electronically monitored via satellite. Once his travel routes
were recorded, Mr. Alazork no longer had control of the flow of information concerning his whereabouts. Therefore, the inquiry does not end
merely because Mr. Alazork's truck was in a public location; rather, the
pertinent question is whether, despite being in public, he reasonably believed he had control over information concerning his location. See Richard C. Balough, Global Positioning System and the Internet: A
Combination with Privacy Risks, 15 Chi. B. Ass'n Rec. 28, 32 (2001).
Even though Mr. Alazork lacked a complete expectation of privacy
with respect to his location, the secret recording of Mr. Alazork's location
via GPS deprived him of the ability to control the flow of information to
others. As a result, Mr. Alazork lost his scholarship, suffered humiliation, and experienced mental distress. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Mr. Alazork reasonably expected that
Haul n' Ride would not utilize GPS to track his every move and disclose
embarrassing, private information concerning his location to others.
Last, the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
C.

SURREPTITIOUS UTILIZATION OF

GPS

is HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO A

REASONABLE PERSON.

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS requires an intrusion to be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977). Whether conduct will be highly offensive to a reasonable person is "largely a matter of social conventions and expectations." J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy
§ 5.10(A)(1)(1993). Courts take into account several factors to determine
if conduct is highly offensive to a reasonable person, including: "the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding
the intrusion as well as the intruder's motives and objectives, the setting
into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
invaded." People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895
P.2d 1269, 1282 (Nev. 1995). Mr. Alazork placed a tremendous amount
of trust in Haul n' Ride when he allowed it to use GPS for emergency
location services. Haul n' Ride betrayed this trust by wrongfully prying
into Mr. Alazork's private affairs. The circumstances as a whole indicate
that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Evidence of an improper motive indicates that an intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. See id. By exceeding the scope
of the rental agreement and using the information collected from GPS for
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non-emergency purposes, Haul n' Ride showed that its motives were improper. In Shulman, the court noted that collection of information for
socially unprotected reasons" makes an intrusion highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 955 P.2d at 493-94. Humiliation, embarrassment,
and harassment are examples of socially unprotected motivations. See
Alexander, 971 F. Supp. at 610 (holding collection and examination of
FBI files for purpose of causing shame, outrage, or public humiliation is
an intrusion upon seclusion). Here, Haul n' Ride's intent was solely to
embarrass and harass Mr. Alazork. Evidence of Haul n' Ride's motive
lies in its racially discriminatory treatment of Zorkesians. Zorkesians
were required to comply with more demanding rental requirements than
persons of non-Zorkesian descent. (R. at 4.) Haul n' Ride also disclosed
to the Society that Mr. Alazork was parked at an adult bookstore. (R. at
6.) This information bore no relation to the alleged terrorist attack. This
disclosure evinces Haul n' Ride's wrongful intent. Upon learning of the
alleged terrorist attack, Streeter, a Haul n' Ride manager, did not immediately contact the authorities; rather, he initially contacted Mr.
Alazork's peers at the Society. Haul n' Ride's conduct alone raises a
question of fact concerning whether the intrusion would have been
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Not only does Haul n' Ride's conduct raise a question of fact, but the
mere use of GPS to engage in high-tech espionage raises an additional
fact question concerning the highly offensive element. Using sensory enhancement technology to collect information is sufficient to raise a fact
question concerning the offensiveness element. Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at
1434. For example, the use of a shotgun microphone to record the plaintiffs conversations could be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id.
A shotgun microphone allowed the defendants in Wolfson to eavesdrop
on the plaintiffs' conversations from far away. Id. at 1424. The shotgun
microphone made the plaintiffs virtual prisoners in their home; thus, the
court found the use of the device presented a genuine issue of fact concerning the offensiveness element. Id. at 1434. Similarly, in Shulman,
the California Supreme Court stated the mere use of the microphone by
a nurse to record private conversations with a patient could be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. 955 P.2d at 494. Like a microphone,
GPS is a powerful sensory enhancement device that provided Haul n'
Ride with constant access to Mr. Alazork's location. Standing alone,
Haul n' Ride's use of GPS to collect private location information about
Mr. Alazork is sufficient to raise a question of fact concerning the highly
offensive element.
Finally, in addition to Haul n' Ride's conduct and use of GPS, Haul
n' Ride's betrayal of customer trust also raises a factual issue concerning
the offensiveness element. A trust relationship between the intruder and
the victim can make an intrusion highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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For example, in Norman-Bloodshaw, the newly hired employees placed a
great deal of trust in their employer when they consented to blood testing. 135 F.3d at 1270. However, the employer's breach of that trust, by
testing for syphilis, sickle cell trait and pregnancy without authorization, constituted a significant invasion of privacy. See id. Because the
employees trusted the employer with their blood samples, the court
found the violation of that trust by improper testing constituted a significant invasion of privacy. Id. Implicit in the court's holding is that a relationship of trust between the parties is evidence that the intrusion would
have been highly offensive to a reasonable person. See id. Like the employees in Norman-Bloodshaw, Mr. Alazork trusted Haul n' Ride to use
GPS for his benefit in case of an emergency. Using information gathered
by GPS to subject Mr. Alazork to ridicule in the eyes of his peers represents a major breach of the trust Mr. Alazork placed in Haul n' Ride;
therefore, the intrusion would have been highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
The gravaman of a claim for intrusion upon seclusion is the injury to
the feelings of the plaintiff and the mental distress caused thereby. Reed
v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz. 1945). If the plaintiff establishes the elements of an intrusion, substantial damages for
mental damages may be recovered. Id. Mr. Alazork was damaged emotionally because of Haul n' Ride's intrusion into his private affairs. The
exact amount of the damage award is a question within the province of
the trier of fact. Meyer v. Ricklick, 409 P.2d 280, 281-82 (Ariz. 1965).
Therefore, the court of appeals also erred when it disposed of the case on
the issue of damages. For the above stated reasons, Mr. Alazork has
presented genuine issues of material fact concerning the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, and this Court should reverse the court of appeals and
remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
II. DEFAMATION LAW PROVIDES NO PROTECTION FROM
LIABILITY FOR STATEMENTS, COUCHED IN THE FORM OF
OPINION, THAT WRONGFULLY IMPLY SPECIFIC CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY OR OTHER WRONGFUL CONDUCT.
The distinction between fact and opinion in defamation law was designed to accommodate "between protection of valuable interests in reputation and the provision of sufficient breathing space for critical and
sometimes caustic free expression." 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 6:1 (2d ed. 2002). However, there is no distinction between opinion
and fact under the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
Milkovich v. Lorain JournalCo., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., Justice Powell, in judicial dictum, stated, "[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
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an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on conscience of
judges and juries but on competition of other ideas." 418 U.S. 323, 33940 (1974). This statement became "the opening salvo in all arguments
for protection from defamation actions on the ground of opinion." Cianci
v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). However, clarifying its position in Gertz, the Supreme Court in Milkovich held no per
se protection of opinion exists under the First Amendment. 497 U.S. at
17. The Court stated, "[tihus we do not think ... Gertz was intended to
create a wholesale defamation exemption from anything that might be
labeled 'opinion.'" Id. According to the Court, such a wholesale exemption would "ignore the fact that expressions of 'opinion' may often imply
an assertion of objective fact." Id. Opinion privilege would be too strong
if it protected the speaker from liability merely because he qualified his
statement as an opinion. Id. at 18. Therefore, where an assertion, no
matter how it is phrased, is provable as false, then such statements are
actionable. Id. at 19. In Milkovich, the Court held an author's opinion
that a high school wrestling coach committed perjury at a hearing was
actionable because the opinion reasonably implied that the coach had in
fact committed perjury. Id. Applying Milkovich to the present case, the
dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could imply from
Streeter's statements an assertion that Mr. Alazork was a terrorist or a
frequenter of adult bookstores. Streeter's accusation of criminal activity
diminished Mr. Alazork's reputation in the community, causing him to
lose his academic scholarship. Without a scholarship, Mr. Alazork was
forced to withdraw from the university. (R. at 7.) Defamation law mandates such vitriolic speech not be protected simply because it was
phrased in the form of an opinion.
A.

No

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS AFFORDED TO STATEMENTS OF
OPINION THAT IMPLY FALSE ACCUSATIONS

OF

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

A charge of criminal behavior necessarily involves a statement of
opinion unless made by an observer of the crime. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64.
Allowing a speaker to escape liability for accusations of criminal activity
merely by couching his accusation in the form of an opinion would allow
a person to damage another's reputation without recourse, thereby undermining the very purpose of defamation law. Id. Hence, opinions that
can reasonably be understood as accusations of specific criminal activity
or other wrongful conduct are defamatory, regardless of how the statement is phrased. Id.
The present case is factually similar to Cianci. In Cianci, an article
in "New Times" magazine implicated Vincent "Buddy" Cianci, Mayor of
Providence, Rhode Island, as the perpetrator of a rape of a woman at
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gunpoint. Id. at 56. The headline read in bold type "BUDDY WE
HARDLY KNEW YA." Id. The article went on to describe the alleged
rape, stating Mayor Cianci had failed three lie detector tests, while the
victim had passed a lie detector test. Id. The article stated Mayor Cianci
bought his way out of a possible felony conviction with a $3000 settlement with the alleged victim. Id. at 58. The article also commented that
the victim had capitalized on her experience. Id. The Second Circuit
found the statements could reasonably be understood as a false statement of fact, namely that Mayor Cianci had in fact raped the alleged
victim at gunpoint. Id. at 60. Discussing the distinction between fact
and opinion, the court noted that specific accusations of criminal activity,
even in the form of opinion, are not constitutionally protected. Id. at 63.
The Court stated "It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer
could escape liability for accusations of defamatory conduct simply by
using, explicitly or implicitly, the words, 'I think."' Id. at 64. Therefore,
the court held that a jury could find that the false accusations of criminal
activity by the magazine were defamatory. Id.
Other courts are in accord with Cianci. In Catalano v. Pechous, 419
N.E.2d 350, 359 (Ill. 1980), the Illinois Supreme Court held
"[a]ccusations of criminal activity, even if in the form of opinion, are not
constitutionally protected." See also Silsdorf v. Levine, 449 N.E.2d 716,
721 (N.Y. 1983) (holding statements in open letter concerning mayor of
Village Beach, New York, were actionable, as a reasonable inference
could be made that the mayor was involved in criminal behavior). In
Catalano,the city clerk of the city of Berwyn, Illinois, concerned over the
city council's award of a contract for garbage collections, uttered, "[tiwo
hundred forty pieces of silver changed handsthirty for each alderman."
419 N.E.2d at 353. The city clerk went on to opine that something was
"smelly" about the contract besides the garbage, and that if it was ever
discovered how the contract was approved, there would be empty chairs
on the city council. Id. The court held the allusion to Judas' betrayal of
Christ was intended to implicate the council members in specific acts of
wrongdoing in the contract. Id. at 355-56. Therefore, the court found the
allusion defamatory. Additionally, the constitutional protection of rhetorical hyperbole does not protect Streeter's statements to Mr. Babazork.
See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'gAss'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 15 (1970) (holding
defendant's statement that the plaintiff was "blackmailing" the city was
constitutionally protected free speech because no one would have considered the defendant's statement to be an actual charge of criminal blackmail). The case at bar is distinguishable because Streeter was not
hurling epithets or hyperbole when he implicated Mr. Alazork. His
statements were intended to imply Mr. Alazork was in fact a terrorist
and a frequenter of adult bookstores; therefore the statements are actionable. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64.
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Streeter's comments were designed to strike a blow to Mr. Alazork's
reputation. Streeter contacted Mr. Babazork after Mr. Alazork failed to
return the rental truck on the due date specified in the rental agreement.
(R. at 5.) Streeter informed Mr. Babazork that Haul n' Ride received a
report of possible terrorist activity in Capital City. (R. at 5.) Streeter
told Mr. Babazork that because he had taken the rental truck out of Marshall and into Capital City, he thought Mr. Alazork might be involved in
the reported terrorist plot. (R. at 5.) Streeter also informed Mr.
Babazork that the truck was located at an adult bookstore. (R. at 6.)
Based on these statements, a reasonable finder of fact could imply an
assertion from Streeter's statements that Mr. Alazork was a terrorist or
a frequenter of adult bookstores. In fact, the Society believed the statements to be an accusation of specific wrongful conduct, as evidenced by
its canceling of Mr. Alazork's scholarship. (R. at 6.) These statements
damaged Mr. Alazork's reputation, eliminated his scholarship, and ended his college career. The constitution does not protect such pejorative
speech; therefore, the court of appeals erred when it held the statements
were mere opinions.
B.

THE FAIR COMMENT PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT FALSE
ACCUSATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

The court of appeals also erred when it held that Streeter's statements were protected by the fair comment privilege. The fair comment
privilege sprung from the early common-law rule that statements of
opinion, even if incapable of being disproven, were actionable if the statement tended to be injurious to reputation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977). To protect against this harsh rule, courts
began to recognize that "valuable discourse might be furthered by intuitive, evaluative statements that could not be proved either true or false
by the rigorous deductive reasoning of the judicial process." See 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 6:4 (2d ed. 2002). Under the fair
comment privilege, legal immunity is afforded for honest expressions of
opinion on matters of public concern, where the statement is based on
true or privileged facts, regardless of whether the statement was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion. See Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 14. However, the fair comment privilege has no application
to an assertion of criminal activity, despite the fact that the assertion
was worded as an opinion. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 66. Because Streeter comments were nothing more than a false accusation of criminal activity, the
defendant cannot claim the protection of the fair comment defense.
First, the fair comment privilege is inapplicable to the case at bar
because it only applies to statements that are incapable of being proven
true or false. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14. According to the codification
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of the fair comment privilege found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566 (1977), an opinion was not actionable if the speaker disclosed the background facts, however unreasonable, forming the basis for
his opinion. Today, opinions can support a defamation action only when
the opinion conveys false representations of facts. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
17. Thus, the disclosure of factual background may indicate whether a
statement constituted a direct charge of criminal activity or a constitutionally protected statement incapable of objective verifiability. Cianci,
639 F.2d at 66. However, the mere disclosure of such facts does not insulate the speaker from liability for opinions that imply specific criminal
activity because such a statement is capable of being verified. Id.; see
also W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tex. L.
Rev. 1221, 1254 (1976) ("any charge of specific misconduct.., should be
treated as a statement of fact regardless of whether the publisher conveys his deductive opinion alone or with the information to support it").
Because the fair comment privilege is only applicable if the statement is
incapable of verifiability, Streeter's false accusation of criminal activity,
a verifiable statement, cannot be protected. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 66.
Second, the fair comment privilege is inapplicable to the case at bar
because Streeter's accusation that Mr. Alazork was a terrorist cannot be
considered a comment. Under the fair comment privilege, to be a comment, the statement had to relate to a matter of public concern. Id. The
policy prompting the development of the fair comment privilege was to
balance the need for public discourse against the need to redress injury
for defamatory speech. Id. A false accusation of specific criminal activity
is not worthy of the protection afforded to vigorous public discourse
under the fair comment privilege because false accusations of criminal
activity have no social utility. Id. Therefore, such expressions do not fall
within the scope of the fair comment privilege. Id. (holding accusation of
criminal activity is antithetical to the usual sort of evaluative judgment
with which the fair comment privilege has traditionally been concerned).
Further, the fair comment privilege does not extend to expressions made
with malice, which means ill will or spite. See id. Here, Streeter immediately phoned Mr. Babazork, informing him that Mr. Alazork might be
engaged in a terrorist plot. (R. at 5.) A person acting without malice
would have phoned the authorities first. Therefore, Streeter's knee-jerk
call to Mr. Babazork raises a question of fact concerning malice, precluding summary judgment.
False accusations of criminal activity are never protected opinion or
fair comment. Because Streeter's comments alleged Mr. Alazork was a
terrorist, they were not protected opinion or fair comment, and were thus
defamatory. Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it held otherwise. Last, Haul n' Ride's unauthorized use of GPS constituted an unfair
deceptive business practice.
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III. HAUL N' RIDE'S SECRET USE OF GPS TO FINE
UNSUSPECTING RENTERS AN UNCONSCIONABLE FEE FOR
TRAVELING BEYOND THE MARSHALL STATE LINE
CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICE.
All fifty states have adopted statutes designed to give private consumers a statutory cause of action against unscrupulous businesses that
engage in deceptive or unfair business practices. Dee Pridgen, Consumer
Protection and the Law, § 3:1 (2000). The ability of citizens to pursue a
private cause of action helps states regulate business activity in the
state. Id. Deceptive trade practice statutes provide consumers with a
statutory cause of action that is not as difficult to pursue as similar state
common-law causes of action. See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d
611, 616 (Tex. 1980) ("[a] primary purpose of the enactment of the [statute] was to provide consumers a cause of action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses encountered in
a common-law fraud or breach of warranty suit."). Therefore, these statutes lessen the unequal bargaining power of the consumer by giving the
consumer an advantage in court. See Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640,
648 (N.J. 1971). Deceptive Trade Practices statutes employ sweeping
language to enjoin a number of harmful business practices in whatever
context the practice might arise. See Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 439, 446 (Ct. App. 2000). And when a scheme violates "the fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing, a court ... is not impotent to
frustrate its consummation because the scheme is an original one." Am.
Philatelic Soc'y v. Clairbourne,46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935).
The use of GPS in rental cars to assess costly fines on unsuspecting
customers is an emerging scheme in the vehicle rental industry. See
Jane Engle, Car Rental Companies May Be Watching You; Lawsuits
ClaimingInvasion of Privacy Say Renters Are Tracked with GPS Devices,
Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 18, 2002, at L5. For example, several persons in
Arizona have filed lawsuits seeking to prevent rental companies from
tracking customers in order to assess fees for going out of state. See id.
Recently, the Consumer Protection Commissioner of Connecticut ordered
a rental car company to cease and desist its practice of using GPS to
assess exorbitant fines for going over a designated speed limit. Press
Release, State of Connecticut Dep't of Consumer Protection, Consumers
Protection OrdersACME Rental to Stop Charging Consumers for Speeding and to Return Fess to Customer (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://
www.state.ct.us/dcp/PressReleases/ ACME.2.htm. According to the commissioner's order, the rental company must clearly and conspicuously
disclose the use of GPS for the purpose of tracking the rented vehicle's
speed, disclose the fee to be assessed for going over the set speed limit,
and set a fee that is reasonably related to the expected damage to the
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vehicle. Id. Haul n' Ride employed the same type of scheme when it
fined Mr. Alazork for traveling beyond the borders of the State of
Marshall.
In order for consumers to reap the substantial benefits GPS has to
offer, rental companies must be trusted to use the technology for the benefit of the consumer. Using GPS to assess unconscionable and hidden
fines for minor breaches of a rental agreement threatens the continued
viability of GPS. While Marshall's legislature has yet to address the
problem with any meaningful legislation limiting rental companies' use
of GPS, this Court can curb this growing problem via the Marshall Deceptive Business Practices Act.
Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act provides:
Unfair deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use
or employment of any deception fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful if, in fact, a reasonable person
could be misled, deceived or damaged by said misrepresentations.
MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 505 MRC 815/2. Under Marshall's Deceptive
Business Practice Act, an omission or misrepresentation of fact is actionable only if the fact was material to the transaction such that a reasonable person could be misled, deceived, or damaged by its omission or
misrepresentation. In affirming summary judgment in favor of Haul n'
Ride, the court of appeals found the failure to inform Mr. Alazork was
not an unfair deceptive business practice because the use of GPS in the
rental truck was not material. (R. at 9-10.) However, Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act does not provide a definition for materiality.
As the following sections illustrate, a fact is material if an average or
reasonable consumer would consider the fact important in making its
decision, and where there is an objective standard, the determination
should be left to the jury except in rare cases. Green v. H & R Block, 735
A.2d 1039, 1059 (Md. 1999). In the present case, the rental agreement
failed to disclose Haul n' Ride's pecuniary interest in GPS. Mr. Alazork
was not warned of the exorbitant fee for crossing the state line, nor was
he warned that embarrassing information about his location would be
disclosed to third persons. All of these facts are material because they
would be important to an average consumers in their rental decision;
therefore, summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride on Mr. Alazork's
Deceptive Business Practices claim was improper.
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WHETHER A FACT IS MATERIAL REQUIRES A DELICATE ASSESSMENT

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT FACT TO AN AVERAGE CONSUMER AND
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT.

The court of appeals erred when it ruled on the materiality of the
use of GPS as a matter of law because the question of materiality, unless
the fact is obviously not important to a consumer, is within the province
of the jury to determine. Id. A fact is material if the average consumer
would find the information important in determining its course of action,
and whether an omission of fact is material under this standard should
be a question for the jury. Id. For example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated "whether an omission would be important to a significant
number of unsophisticated consumers is a question of fact for the jury."
Id. Further, the question should be taken from the fact finder and decided as a matter of law only if the "fact do not allow for a reasonable
inference of materiality or immateriality." Id. Therefore, the threshold
to establish a fact question concerning materiality is minimal under the
objective standard. See id.
The issue of materiality arises in a number of other areas of law and
will be helpful in this Court's determination of materiality under Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices statute. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977), which governs the fraudulent
misrepresentation tort, a fact is material if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question." In explaining the reasonable man standard, the RESTATEMENT provides:
As in all cases in which the conduct of the reasonable man is the standard, the question of whether a reasonable man would have regarded
the fact misrepresented to be important in determining his course of
action is a matter for the judgment of the jury subject to control of the
court. The court may withdraw the case from the jury if the fact misrepresented is so obviously unimportant that the jury could not reasonably find that a reasonable man would have been influenced by it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 cmt. e. (1977). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS takes an objective approach when determining whether a contractual misrepresentation is material.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981) ("[a] misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to
manifest his assent."). The determination of whether the defendant acted with reasonable care ordinarily precludes summary judgment in negligence cases. See 10 Charles Alan Wright et al, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2729 (1998). Further, the Federal Trade Commission, which
governs deceptive and unfair trade practices affecting interstate commerce, utilizes an objective approach to materiality. See, e.g., Am. Home
Prods. v. FTC, 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 (1981), affd 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
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1982) (holding a claim is material if it is likely to affect consumer
behavior).
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court was
asked to provide a definition of materiality under Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. See 485 U.S.
224, 227 (1988). The relevant portion of Rule 10b-5 states "[I]t shall be
unlawful for any person ... [to make any untrue statement of material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made . . . not misleading ... in connection with the sale or
purchase of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). According to
the Court, a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would find the disclosure of the omitted fact important in the total mix of all of the information available. Basic, 485 U.S.
at 232. The Supreme Court applied the same definition in determining
materiality under SEC Rule 14a-9 as defined by 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9
(1975). See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) ("The
question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.").
The Supreme Court's analysis of whether summary judgment is appropriate where a question of materiality exists is particularly helpful to
the case at bar. Id. at 450. According to the Court, the underlying facts,
which are often undisputed, are only the starting point for the determination of materiality. Id. Rather, a determination of materiality entails
a "delicate assessment" of the inferences a reasonable investor would
draw from the underlying facts and the importance of the inferences to a
reasonable investor. Id. Therefore, the determination of materiality is
for the trier of fact, and this decision should only be decided as a matter
of law if "it is so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable
minds cannot differ on the question of materiality." Id. (quoting Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
This court should adopt the objective test of materiality. The objective standard furthers the goal of deceptive business practices statutes to
provide relief to the average consumer from unscrupulous business practices, but provides enough flexibility for businesses to operate. See Basic,
485 U.S at 231. The objective standard insures not every trivial omission of fact in a transaction will be a violation of the statute, but it allows
the finder of fact to determine the importance of a particular fact to an
average consumer. Id. Next, the objective approach is consistent with
the great weight of authority that has dealt with the issue of materiality.
Further, Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act seems to mandate
that an objective standard be observed. The statute instructs that a
practice is not unlawful unless "a reasonable person could be misled,
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deceived or damaged by said misrepresentation." MARSHALL REVISED
CODE, 505 MRC 815/2.
Applying the objective standard of materiality to the present case,
summary judgment is improper unless it is so obvious that the average
consumer would find the failure to disclose the various ways GPS would
be employed unimportant. See Green, 735 A.2d at 1059. As the following
sections illustrate, it is not obvious that the disclosure of all of the various ways GPS would be used against the renter would be unimportant to
the average consumer. Therefore, the court should remand the case for a
trial on the merits.
B.

HAUL N' RIDE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ITS SECRET PECUNIARY
INTEREST IN

GPS

CONSTITUTES A MATERIAL OMISSION.

Haul n' Ride's failure to disclose its pecuniary interest in GPS is material. See Green, 735 A.2d at 1058. In Green, customers of H & R Block,
a tax preparation service company, filed a class action lawsuit alleging a
violation of the Maryland's Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 1043. Maryland's Consumer Protection Act is similar to Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act. See id. at 1058. The business practice in dispute
involved H & R Block's rapid refund program. Id. at 1043. As part of the
rapid refund program, H & R Block acted as a loan facilitator of a Refund
Anticipation Loan ("RAL") between its customers and a third party bank.
Id. at 1044. The cost of the RAL is described as a "finance charge" in the
loan materials. Id. at 1045. The annual percentage rate corresponding
to the finance charge ranged from 25% to 500% depending on the amount
of the refund and the amount of finance charge to a particular customer.
Id. at 1044. However, the RAL material did not disclose the methods in
which H & R Block stood to benefit from the RAL program. Id. at 1045.
First, H & R Block received a "license fee" from the third party bank for
each loan customer referred by H & R Block to the bank. Id. Second, H
& R Block secretly arranged to purchase about one half of all of the
RAL's from the bank. Id. Third, H & R Block received 15% of the checkcashing fee for each RAL check cashed at Sears, Roebuck, & Company
("Sears"). Id. H & R Block has many locations inside Sears and encouraged its customers to cash the RAL checks at Sears. Id. The plaintiffs' claims turned on whether H & R Block's failure to disclose the
numerous ways it benefited under the RAL was a material fact. Id. The
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of H & R Block. Id. at
1058. On writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed holding that a
genuine issue of fact concerning the materiality of H & R Block's failure
to disclose its interest in the RAL prohibited summary judgment in favor
of the bank. Id. at 1058. According to the court, a reasonable inference
could be drawn that an average consumer may consider "important the
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knowledge that the 'finance' cost of the loan is in inflated by virtue of the
various ways H & R Block stands to benefit." Id. at 1059.
Haul n' Ride's embrace of GPS to penalize renters is an undisclosed
pecuniary interest much like H & R Block's secret interest in the RAL
Program. Haul n' Ride's rental agreement is silent as to the use of GPS
in assessing fees. (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Rather, the rental
agreement lulls the customer into a sense of security concerning the use
of GPS. The loan agreement affirmatively states "[t]he truck may be
equipped with global positioning satellite (GPS) and/or cellular phone
technology for emergency location services." (See Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Two aspects of this contractual provision suggest an omission of
fact concerning the use of GPS to assess a fee. The word "may" suggests
an ambivalence concerning GPS. The record is unclear concerning how
many Haul n' Ride vehicles are actually equipped with GPS; however,
the word "may" does not provide the consumer with sufficient notice that
GPS would be placed in the vehicle. Further, Haul n' Ride placed the
GPS device in the truck's engine compartment so that the consumer
would not know if the truck was equipped with GPS. (R. at 4.) Next, the
rental agreement confines the use of GPS to "emergency location services." However, assessing a fee for a minor contractual infraction can
hardly be considered a service to the average customer. Because the
rental agreement did not provide the average consumer with notice of
the secret benefit Haul n' Ride stood to gain via GPS, there is an omission of fact in the rental agreement. See Green, 735 A.2d at 1059 ("the
evidence also permits a fact finder to conclude that the characterization
of the cost of the loan as a 'finance charge' without further disclosure
misleads consumers who would consider it an important factor in determining whether to pursue the loan through H & R Block"). Therefore,
the omission is material because an average consumer may reasonably
want to know the various ways Haul n' Ride stood to benefit under the
rental agreement. Id. Next, Haul n' Ride's misrepresentation concerning the minimum fee imposed is material.
C.

HAUL N' RIDE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE TOTAL FEE IMPOSED FOR
TAKING THE RENTAL VEHICLE ACROSS THE MARSHALL STATE LINE
CONSTITUTES A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION.

The average consumer would consider the total fee imposed for violation of the rental agreement important in deciding whether to take the
vehicle across the state line. See MacMillan, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 208, 303-04
(1980). In MacMillan, LaSalle Extension University failed to disclose to
its students the number of lesson assignments to be submitted in a
course. Id. Students needed to know this information because their tuition obligation was calculated on the number of lesson assignments to be

20021

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

submitted. Id. Therefore, the failure to disclose this information was
material because the average student would consider the total tuition
obligation important in deciding whether to take the course. Id.
Here, the rental agreement stated the renter would be charged a fee
for taking the vehicle out of state, and the minimum fee was $100. (See
Rental Agreement, Exhibit B.) Yet, Mr. Alazork was charged a fee in
excess of $1500. (R. at 6.) Like MacMillan, a full disclosure concerning
the fee is necessary in determining a renter's obligation for taking the
vehicle across the state line. Had an average consumer known the fee, it
is reasonable to assume that he or she would not have ventured past the
borders of the state.
The fact that the fee was avoidable should not prevent Mr. Alazork
from pursuing his deceptive business practices claim. The present case
is analogous to the facts in Schnall. In that case, customers of Hertz
brought a cause of action alleging the fuel service charge imposed under
Hertz's rental agreement violated California's unfair competition law,
which is analogous to Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act. Id.
Under the rental agreement, the renter could choose to return the vehicle with a full tank of gas and avoid the fuel service charge imposed by
Hertz, or the renter could allow Hertz to refuel the vehicle at the applicable rate specified in the rental agreement. Id. However, the rate specified in the rental agreement was not at all clear to the consumer. The
rental agreement used confusing formulas and needlessly complex language relating to the application of the rates under the rental agreement. Id. at 454. Hertz argued that the service charge was avoidable
because the renter could bring the vehicle back with a full tank of gas.
Id. However, the court disagreed. Id. According to the court, "[tihe failure.., to make it clear.., that an avoidable charge ... is considerably
higher than the retail rate for an item or service . . . would doubtless
encourage . . . customers to incur a fuel service charge they could and
would otherwise avoid." Therefore, the plaintiffs' stated a claim under
the unfair competition law for concealing the fuel service charge. Id.
The fuel service charge in Hertz is similar to the fee imposed by Haul
n' Ride. The customer could avoid the fee by simply not traveling beyond
the borders of the state; however, the rental agreement does not provide
the consumer with sufficient notice that the applicable fee will not bear
any similarity to Haul n' Ride's actual cost incurred when the vehicle
goes beyond the borders of the state. The rental agreement stated a minimum fee, but it did not provide any definition of the method at which
Haul n' Ride calculated the fee or the total fee imposed. (See Rental
Agreement, Exhibit B.) The failure to describe the method by which
Haul n' Ride will assess a fee coupled with the confusing language concerning the use of GPS for "emergency location services", has a tendency
to mislead the consumer both as to the total fee and the method of as-
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sessing the fee. In the present case, the fee imposed by Haul n' Ride
exceeded $1500, yet Mr. Alazork only traveled thirty miles past Marshall's border. (R. at 5.) Had Mr. Alazork known of the total amount of
the fee, or at the very least, the method of assessing the fee via GPS, he
would not have taken the rental truck beyond the Marshall state line.
Because an average consumer would consider this information important, the misrepresentation concerning the minimum fee is material.
Last, the failure to warn Mr. Alazork that his private location information would be disclosed to third persons was a material omission.
D.

HAUL N' RIDE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THAT PRIVATE INFORMATION
RECORDED BY GPS WOULD BE REVEALED TO THIRD PERSONS
CONSTITUTES A MATERIAL OMISSION.

GPS poses a significant risk to an individual's right to privacy. See
Richard C. Balough, Global PositioningSystem and the Internet:A Combination with PrivacyRisks, 15 Chi. B. Ass'n Rec. 28, 32 (2001). Because
GPS provided Haul n' Ride with a wealth of information concerning Mr.
Alazork's location, Haul n' Ride had enveloping and instant access to
sensitive and private information concerning Mr. Alazork's location.
However, Haul n' Ride divulged this private information to Mr. Alazork's
peers thereby inflicting emotional and pecuniary damage. Because an
average consumer would want to know that location information gathered via GPS would be disclosed to third persons, the failure to disclose
this information constituted a material omission in the rental agreement. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
In Dwyer, American Express cardholders sued American Express alleging the practice of releasing personal information to other merchants
constituted a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Id at 1356.
American Express, as part of a joint marketing agreement and sales program, compiled information about its cardholders spending habits and
then categorized and ranked the cardholders into six tiers based on their
spending habits. Id. at 1353. Then American Express rented this information to third party merchants. Id. In analyzing the materiality requirement under the Illinois Consumer Protection Act, the court stated,
"it is highly possible that some customers would have refrained from using the American Express Card if they had known that defendants were
analyzing their spending habits." Id. at 1357. Therefore, the plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged the undisclosed practice was material. Id. Similarly,
the undisclosed practice of divulging personal information about Mr.
Alazork is material. Haul n' Ride contacted Mr. Babazork and told him
that Mr. Alazork might be involved in terrorist activity and also that he
was parked at an adult bookstore. (R. at 5.) It is reasonable that an
average consumer would not rent from Haul n' Ride had the person
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known that private information would be disclosed to third persons. See
Dywer, 652 N.E.2d at 1357. Therefore, the failure to inform the customer about the invasive use of GPS is material. For the above reasons,
Mr. Alazork has presented genuine issues of material fact concerning his
deceptive business practices claim.
CONCLUSION
George Orwell was right. In 1984's fictitious state, Oceania, the
"Thought Police" utilized powerful technology to monitor everyone's
thoughts and actions, and the scrutiny was inescapable. George Orwell,
1984 4 (1949). Orwell wrote, "You had to live-did live, from habit that
became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was
overheard and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized." Id.
Today's technology is even more powerful than perhaps Orwell would
expect, yet Mr. Alazork should not have to sit idly by while businesses
like Haul n' Ride use technology, like GPS, to take advantage of him.
First, Mr. Alazork has affirmatively established genuine issues of
fact on all of the elements of his intrusion upon seclusion claim. Haul n'
Ride intruded upon Mr. Alazork's seclusion when it utilized GPS, powerful sensory enhancement technology, to pry into his private affairs. The
information gathered via GPS was highly personal, and Haul n' Ride
should not be allowed to rely on outdated case law that does not take into
account the vast impact technology has had on privacy law. See, e.g.,
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens . . . has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."). Therefore, despite being in a public location, Haul
n' Ride's use of GPS constituted a significant invasion of his privacy.
Second, Streeter's statements accusing Mr. Alazork of being a terrorist and a frequenter of adult bookstores was neither a protected opinion nor fair comment. Outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are
defamatory, even if the speaker phrases his comment in the form of opinion. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64. Any other rule would allow Streeter to
inflict serious damage on Mr. Alazork's reputation without recourse.
Last, Mr. Alazork, an average consumer, was deceived by Haul n'
Ride's material omission of fact concerning the various ways it intended
to use GPS against Mr. Alazork. The use of GPS to trick renters out of
their hard earned money and disclose private information about them is
a new scheme in the rental industry; however, it is exactly this type of
scheme Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act is intended to prevent. For deceptive trade practices statutes are "intentionally framed
in... broad, sweeping language.., to enable judicial tribunals to deal
with the innumerable 'new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.'" Schnall, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446. Materiality is a
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question of fact under Marshall's Deceptive Business Practices Act and it
was wrong for the court of appeals to rule on the issue as a matter of law.
The use of GPS raises questions of fact concerning materiality because it
is obvious that reasonable consumers would find the use of GPS for nonemergency purposes important in their rental decision. Therefore, summary judgment was improper on the deceptive business practices claim.
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the First District
Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded to the Potter
County Circuit Court for a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE USE OF
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY IN RENTAL VEHICLES WAS
NOT AN INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION AS A MATTER OF LAW?

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT HAUL N'
RIDE'S STATEMENTS REGARDING ALAZORK WERE OPINION AND/OR FAIR
COMMENT?

III.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT HAUL N'
RIDE DID NOT VIOLATE THE DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT?
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TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MARSHALL:
Respondent, Haul n' Ride, Inc. ("Haul n' Ride"), Appellee in Cause
No. 02-CV-3024 before the First District Court of Appeals for the State of
Marshall (and Defendant before the trial court), respectfully submits
this brief in response to the brief filed by the Petitioner, Robert Alazork
("Alazork"), Plaintiff-Appellant below, and requests this Honorable
Court affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
OPINION BELOW
The Potter County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Haul n' Ride. The First District Court of Appeals of the State of
Marshall affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment
as shown in the record.
STATUTORY AND RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The State of Marshall enacted an intrusion upon seclusion statute,
section 735 MRC 15/40, that follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS section 652B. The State of Marshall also enacted a defamation
statute, section 735 MRC 15/30, that follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS

section 558. The relevant provisions of the

RESTATEMENT (SEC-

sections 652B and 558 are provided in Appendices A and
B, respectively. The State of Marshall enacted a Deceptive Business
Practices statute, section 505 MRC 815/2, the relevant provisions of
which are provided in Appendix C.
OND) OF TORTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Haul n' Ride, Inc. ("Haul n' Ride") provides nationwide rental truck
services. (R. at 3.) Recently, Haul n' Ride has received negative publicity
focusing on possible illicit uses of Haul n' Ride rental trucks. (R. at 4.)
Specific reports suggest individuals used Haul n' Ride rental trucks to
smuggle illegal immigrants, weapons, and explosives into the country.
Id. Furthermore, Zorkesian terrorists possibly used Haul n' Ride's trucks
in their terrorist activities. Id. Consequently, Haul n' Ride instituted an
"anti-terrorism" policy, in which local dealers must request certain additional information from customers appearing suspicious. Id. Under the
new policy, dealers must obtain the additional information from individuals seeking rentals of three or more days, out of state rentals, rentals to
individuals under twenty-five years old, rentals to individuals appearing
to be of Zorkesian descent, or individuals who otherwise appear to present a potential liability risk. (R. at Ex. A.)
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In addition to the safeguards discussed above, Haul n' Ride equips
most of its rental trucks with global positioning system ("GPS") technology. (R. at 3.) GPS technology uses a network of satellites and corresponding ground stations to transmit data. Id. A device in the rental
truck's engine compartment receives the transmitted data and uses the
data to determine the location of the vehicle. (R. at 3-4.) Because Haul
n' Ride may access the rental truck locations from remote distances,
Haul n' Ride is able to utilize the GPS collected data in various ways,
including: emergency location services, navigation or travel information,
and finding stolen rental vehicles. (R. at 4.) Furthermore, the GPS technology maintains a trip log which records the precise distance and route
the rental truck traveled. Id. All customers renting Haul n' Ride vehicles sign standard rental agreements which include a notice that "[t]he
truck may be equipped with global positioning satellite (GPS) and/or cellular phone technology for emergency location services." ( R. at Ex. B.)
Robert Alazork ("Alazork") is a twenty year-old college student of
Zorkesian descent attending Capitol College in Capitol City, West
Ducoda. (R. at 2.) Although Alazork attends college out of state in West
Ducoda, he established his residence in Smallville, Marshall. Id. In the
summer of 2000, Alazork contacted Haul n' Ride's national toll-free telephone number to assist him in his move into an off-campus apartment at
Capitol College. (R. at 3.) He was connected with a local Haul n' Ride
rental agency in Smallville. (R. at 3.) Haul n' Ride manager, John
Streeter, spoke with Alazork and described the two rental options that
Haul n' Ride offers. Id. First, Alazork could purchase a "one-way" rental
if the truck would be taken out of state and returned to a different Haul
n' Ride location. Id. This option requires a higher rental rate in order to
cover the cost of maintaining a national network of Haul n' Ride locations and the increased insurance expenses associated with driving the
trucks in multiple states. Id. The rental agreement further explained
that a truck leaving the state incurs the one-way rental rate. (R. at Ex.
B.) The second and less expensive option, the "local" rental, may be purchased if the truck is used in town and is returned to the Smallville Haul
n' Ride location. (R. at 3.) Although Alazork would be attending Capitol
College, and therefore would be taking the rental truck into the neighboring state of West Ducoda, Alazork nevertheless reserved a rental
truck for three days under the "local" rental option. Id.
Alazork provided the requested information in the rental agreement
including his name, addresses, telephone numbers, and financial and
personal references. (R. at 4.) Alazork listed Tom Babazork, the sponsor
of an annual scholarship program instituted by the Zorkesian-American
Society, as his personal and financial reference. (R. at 2, 4.) Mr.
Babazork recently presented Alazork with an academic scholarship for
the 2000-2001 academic year. (R. at 2.) According to Alazork's rental

2002]

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

agreement, Alazork would depart with the rental truck on August 20,
2000, and return the truck to the Smallville Haul n' Ride location on
August 23, 2000. (R. at 5.)
Not only did Alazork violate the terms of the local rental agreement
by driving the truck beyond Marshall state lines, Alazork failed to return
the rental vehicle on August 23, 2000. (R. at 5, 6.) Meanwhile, on August 23, 2000, Mr. Streeter received a notice from the Haul n' Ride corporate office stating that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had
alerted the company to terrorist threats potentially involving a rental
truck destined for Capitol City. (R. at 5; R. at Ex. C.) The notice from
corporate headquarters requested that Mr. Streeter immediately locate
any trucks within a thirty (30) mile radius of Capitol City and report
those trucks to Haul n' Ride security officials. (R. at Ex. C.)
In an attempt to comply with the corporate request and avoid an
emergency or crisis, Mr. Streeter immediately employed the GPS technology to locate all of his rental vehicles. (R. at 5.) Mr. Streeter learned
that the truck Alazork rented was in Capitol City in the neighboring
state of West Ducoda. Id. Using a reverse directory on the Internet and
the GPS location data, Mr. Streeter learned that Alazork parked the
truck in front of an adult bookstore. Id. Consequently, Mr. Streeter began contacting Alazork's references listed in the rental agreement, including Mr. Babazork. Id. Mr. Streeter also charged Alazork's credit
card for the significantly higher "one-way" rental rate rather than the
"local" rental rate, as per the rental agreement terms, because Alazork
took the truck beyond Marshall state lines. (R. at 6.)
Upon contacting Mr. Babazork, Mr. Streeter informed him that Haul
n' Ride had received a report of suspected terrorist activity, and that
Alazork was currently in violation of his rental agreement for taking a
truck out of state. (R. at 5.) As a result, Mr. Streeter was concerned that
Alazork "might be involved or in trouble." (R. at 5-6.) Mr. Streeter also
provided Mr. Babazork with the current location of the rental truck.
Mr. Babazork and Alazork's personal relationship may be reasonably characterized as more than mere acquaintances. In order to obtain
the scholarship presented to him by Mr. Babazork and the ZorkesianAmerican Society, Alazork submitted an essay describing the importance
of community involvement in American and Zorkesian societies. (R. at
2.) Mr. Babazork personally interviewed the final applicants, including
Alazork, and after being presented with the scholarship, Alazork spoke
to the Zorkesian-American Society on the importance of excelling in
school, serving the community, and honoring one's heritage. Id. Furthermore, Alazork subsequently attended a number of the ZorkesianAmerican Society meetings. (R. at 3.) However, despite having significant knowledge of Alazork's character, Babazork cancelled Alazork's
scholarship after speaking with Mr. Streeter. (R. at 6.) Mr. Babazork
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made no attempt to verify the accuracy of Mr. Streeter's opinion that
Alazork may be involved or in trouble. Id.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Alazork sued Haul n' Ride in the Potter County Circuit Court seeking monetary damages, and he alleged causes of action in intrusion upon
seclusion, defamation, and violations of the Deceptive Business Practices
statute. (R. at 7, 8.) Neither party disputes the facts set forth in the
record below. (R. at 2.) Haul n' Ride moved for summary judgment, and
the Potter County Circuit Court granted Haul n' Ride's motion for summary judgment on all three of Alazork's claims. (R. at 1-2.)
The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride. The court of appeals determined that Alazork failed to establish an issue of material fact regarding intrusion upon seclusion in holding that the act of using GPS
technology was neither objectionable nor offensive which caused any
anguish or suffering. (R. at 7.) Also, Haul n' Ride's summary judgment
was proper as to defamation, because Haul n' Ride's statements were
properly classified as opinions or fair comments. (R. at 8.) Finally, the
court of appeals held that Haul n' Ride was not bound by the rental
agreement to notify Alazork of the use of GPS technology to track the
truck's location, therefore, summary judgment on the deceptive business
practices issue was also proper. (R. at 10.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
On de novo review, this Court should affirm the decision of the First
District Court of Appeals which affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride on Alazork's claims for intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and deceptive business practices. A summary
judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, when
a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment is proper. Applying the law of intrusion upon seclusion to the undisputed facts of this case, Haul n' Ride did not commit an
intrusion upon Alazork's seclusion. Only when a defendant believes he
lacks permission to commit the intrusive act, does an intrusion occur.
However, Alazork granted Haul n' Ride permission to use GPS technology by signing the rental agreement which contained a provision allowing for such use. Alazork's consent to the use of GPS technology
negates any inference that Haul n' Ride lacked the required permission
to use the GPS technology, and no intrusion occurred.
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Furthermore, a claim for intrusion upon seclusion cannot survive
unless the intrusive act may be considered offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable person. After considering the context, conduct, and circumstances giving rise to Alazork's claim, as well as the motives and objectives behind Haul n' Ride's use of the GPS technology, this Court must
determine that any degree of intrusiveness was insubstantial. In order
to assert an expectation of privacy, Alazork must have conducted himself
in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy. Alazork
drove a commercial vehicle and parked it in a public venue which diminished any expectation of privacy Alazork may have possessed. Additionally, any degree of intrusion was slight because GPS technology involves
the non-invasive use of satellites to pinpoint the location of Haul n'
Ride's trucks which do not interfere with the purposes for which Alazork
rented the truck. Alazork's own conduct evidences no expectation of privacy, and the degree of intrusiveness of GPS technology is slight. Consequently, a reasonable person cannot find Haul n' Ride's use of GPS
technology offensive or objectionable.
Finally, Haul n' Ride's use of GPS technology did not cause the injury claimed by Alazork. The damages alleged by Alazork resulted from
Mr. Babazork's reinterpretation and misuse of the information he received from Haul n' Ride, not the use of GPS technology. Because
Alazork's claim for intrusion upon seclusion fails in all of its essential
elements, a reasonable jury could render only one conclusion. Thus,
summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride was properly granted.
II.
Haul n' Ride cannot be subject to defamation liability based upon its
comments to Mr. Babazork because the law provides the affirmative defense of opinion or fair comment. Although opinions are protected
speech, false statements of fact are not afforded similar protection. The
statements made by Haul n' Ride, however, are statements of opinion.
The common usage and meaning of the language used by Haul n' Ride
are so loosely defined that the expression may be subject to various interpretations, a clear indication of opinion. Furthermore, the statements
are incapable of being objectively verified as true or false because the
statement that Alazork "might be involved or in trouble" lacks any precision as to its meaning, yet another indication of opinion. Finally, the
immediate context of Haul n' Ride's expression as well as the broader
social context of the statement indicate that the statements are opinion.
The immediate context of the statement indicates that Haul n' Ride disclosed the underlying facts upon which it founded its opinion that
Alazork "might be involved or in trouble." When the underlying facts
upon which an individual bases his opinion are fully disclosed, the expression enjoys the protected status of opinion. Finally, the broader so-
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cial context reveals that Haul n' Ride was simply upholding its duty to
society by staying vigilant in combating terrorism. After receiving notice
of possible terrorist activities, Haul n' Ride promptly and vigilantly acted
in order to thwart possible death and destruction.
Finally, Haul n' Ride's statements also fall squarely within the affirmative defense of fair comment. The fair comment privilege extends
to statements of opinion on matters of public concern so long as the
critic's opinion was his own, and he did not make the comment for purposes of causing harm to the object of the comment. Undoubtedly, the
public concern for terrorism has grown recently; however, the impact of
terrorism on America was no less critical in years past. Because Haul n'
Ride's comments fit within the fair comment defense, Alazork shouldered
the burden of establishing that Haul n' Ride's statements were made for
the sole purpose of defaming him. The record indicates, however, that
Haul n' Ride had received notice from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that their trucks might be involved in terrorist activities. Because
Alazork failed to establish that Haul n' Ride made the statements for the
sole purpose of defaming him, and the statements could otherwise be
characterized as protected opinion, the Circuit Court's grant of summary
judgment if favor of Haul n' Ride was proper as to Alazork's defamation
claim.
III.
Alazork's final claim against Haul n' Ride alleged violations of the
Marshall Deceptive Business Practices statute. This statute prohibits
the omission or concealment of material facts. However, the use of GPS
technology was not essential to the transaction between Haul n' Ride and
Alazork. In renting the truck to move back to college, Alazork failed to
inquire into the availability of GPS technology in Haul n' Ride rental
trucks. Furthermore, after signing the rental agreement, Alazork
showed no further interest in the agreement provision that informed him
of the availability of GPS technology. The fact that Haul n' Ride disclosed the use of GPS technology in the rental agreement defeats any
claim of omission or concealment; however, should this Court hold that
the information was not fully disclosed, the omission or concealment cannot be considered a material fact since the information was not essential
to the underlying transaction.
Moreover, Haul n' Ride fully disclosed the price difference and circumstances which distinguish local rental from one-way rental plans.
Had Alazork simply read the terms of the agreement to which he was
bound, he would have learned that he would be subject to the one-way
rental rate. However, despite being told of the rental arrangements and
having the rental agreement terms available, Alazork chose the local
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rental plan. After being found in violation of the rental terms, Alazork
now attempts to avoid the increased rental rate by alleging an omission
or concealment by Haul n' Ride. However, after applying the law to the
undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could render but one conclusion in
favor of Haul n' Ride; therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor Haul n' Ride.
Haul n' Ride recognizes that Alazork's situation is lamentable. However, any loss suffered by Alazork resulted from Mr. Babazork's independent actions, and not as a result of Haul n' Ride's statements or use of
GPS technology. Haul n' Ride should not be punished for its attempt to
strike a blow against terrorism. Consequently, the Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment for Haul n' Ride on all three of Alazork's
claims.
ARGUMENT
The Marshall Supreme Court should affirm the First District Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Potter County Circuit Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride. The court of appeals and
the circuit court properly held Haul n' Ride not liable for the statutory
claims of intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and deceptive business
practices. Under Marshall Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate
when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 mandates summary judgment when the party carrying the burden of proof at
trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
essential element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Additionally, "[a] party is entitled to summary judgment 'if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
verdict.'" Church v. Gen. Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). Because the various commercial and private uses clearly benefit society,
the court of appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride.
GPS technology employs approximately twenty-four satellites that
send out radio signals to a receiver in order to establish location. Aaron
Reneger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 Hastings L.J.
549, 550 (2002). GPS technology serves many vital functions within today's society. In fact, former President Clinton ordered that the selective
availability of GPS be discontinued in order to make GPS more responsive to civil and commercial users worldwide. Office of Science and Technology, President Clinton: Improving the Civilian Global Positioning
System (GPS)(Sept. 14, 2002), at http://www.ostp.gov/html/0053_4.html.
For example, uses of GPS include air, road, rail, and marine navigation,
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precision agriculture and mining, oil exploration, environmental research and management, telecommunications, electronic data transfer,
construction, recreation, and emergency response. Id.
Furthermore, some school districts may use GPS to track public busing systems. Kevin Duffy, Satellites Watch as School Buses Travel the
Roads; County Installs Tracking System, Atlanta J. & Const., Aug. 29,
2002, at 3JI. In Clayton County, Georgia, fifty new buses were equipped
with GPS so a frustrated parent calling the school system may receive a
precise answer to her question, "Where's my child's bus?" Id. The school
system is apparently attempting to avoid incidents such as the one that
occurred last January in Pennsylvania when an armed man took thirteen children hostage on a 160 mile trip along the eastern seaboard. Id.
Frantic parents worried about their children's location as helicopters
searched for the hijacked bus. Id. Also, several years ago in Clayton
County, a child suffered a seizure on the bus, and the driver was not able
to determine whether it would be quicker to return the child home or to
continue to the school for assistance. With the use of GPS technology,
both buses in the above situations could have been immediately located
and assistance rendered.
Other applications of GPS technology include tracking individuals
on probation. Zachary R. Dowdy, Using Higher Tech to Monitor Offenders, Newsday, Aug. 28, 2002, at A39. Now, high-tech bracelets allow probation officers to keep tighter reins on high-risk individuals such as sex
offenders. Id. GPS allows for real-time tracking of the probationers to
see exactly where they are going, including places they are not allowed to
be, such as schools. Id. Also, parents may be able to track the movements of their children with GPS bracelets. Christine Jackman, Bracelet
to Track Kids by Satellite, Sunday Mail (QLD), Aug. 25, 2002, at 3. The
bracelets may be set to sound an alarm when a child wanders beyond
certain boundaries. Id. When a child in missing, kidnapped, or injured,
a parent can simply logon to an Internet site that displays the location of
their child. Id.
GPS technology will become an integral part of society within the
next few years. In fact, in 2000, the market for GPS applications was
expected to double by 2003, increasing from $8 billion to over $16 billion.
Office of Science and Technology, supra. Society recognizes the instant
benefits of GPS technology, rather than considering it a threat to its individual liberties. Despite such general acceptance, Alazork claims Haul
n' Ride committed an intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and deceptive business practices. However, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride.
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I. NO INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION ARISES FROM THE USE
OF GPS TECHNOLOGY TO TRACK THE LOCATION OF RENTAL
TRUCKS BECAUSE ALAZORK ESTABLISHED NONE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's grant of summary
judgment for Haul n' Ride on Alazork's intrusion upon seclusion claim.
The claim is based on the Marshall statute which follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) provision and requires proof of the following four
elements:
1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion;
2) the intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable
person;
3) the matter on which the intrusion occurs must be private, and
4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering.
MARSHALL REVISED CODE § 735 MRC 15/40. Examining the four elements of intrusion under the undisputed facts shows that the use of the
GPS technology in its rental trucks does not intrude upon seclusion.
A.

THE USE OF

GPS

TECHNOLOGY IN RENTAL VEHICLES DOES NOT

AMOUNT TO AN INTRUSION WHEN THE ACTOR BELIEVES HE RECEIVED

THE NECESSARY LEGAL OR PERSONAL PERMISSION TO COMMIT AN
OTHERWISE INTRUSIVE ACT.

One of the most fundamental freedoms on which our country has
grounded its roots is a person's right to privacy, or to be let alone. Like
all great and fundamental freedoms, however, the right to privacy is not
absolute. In pursuing a claim for an invasion of privacy, one must proceed within the confines of the appropriate statute. Under the Marshall
intrusion upon seclusion statute which mirrors the corresponding Restatement provision, Alazork must first establish that Haul n' Ride committed an intrusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
However, because Haul n' Ride believed it obtained the proper permission from Alazork to use the GPS technology, no intrusion occurred.
An intrusion, for invasion of privacy purposes, occurs when an actor
"believes, or is substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or
personal permission to commit the intrusive act." Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3rd Cir. 1989)). For
example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fletcher held that the
defendant intruded. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876. In Fletcher, when the
plaintiff developed a work-related injury, her manager requested that
she fill out a worker's compensation form. Id. at 873-74. However, she
did not seek worker compensation benefits. Id. at 874 n.1. The manager
then used the worker compensation form to obtain the plaintiffs injury
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information from her doctor. Id. at 874. In finding that an intrusion
occurred, the court of appeals recognized that the grocery store manager
used a worker's compensation form to deviously obtain information
about the plaintiffs injury, although the plaintiff never sought worker's
compensation benefits. Id. at 876.
The present facts bear no resemblance to those presented before the
court in Fletcher because Haul n' Ride obtained the necessary legal or
personal permission to use the GPS technology. Haul n' Ride and
Alazork entered into a rental agreement that set forth various terms,
including the dates the rental truck would depart from the Haul n' Ride
office and when Alazork would return the truck. (R. at 5.) Among the
eleven express terms listed in the agreement was a statement acknowledging that the truck may be equipped with GPS technology. The agreement further stated that Haul n' Ride may use the GPS technology to
locate the vehicle in emergency situations such as mechanical malfunctions, accident, or theft. (R. at 4; R. at Ex. B.) Alazork expressly agreed
to all terms and conditions listed within the rental contract when he entered into the agreement and signed it. Id.
When a person provides legal or personal permission to commit an
intrusive act, no intrusion occurs. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876. Essentially,
Alazork's legal commitment under the terms of the rental contract
amounted to permission or consent to Haul n' Ride's use of the GPS technology. At least one state has inferred that consent to search negates
any possible intrusion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634
(Ark. 2002). The Arkansas Supreme Court in Lee addressed a situation
in which an employee agreed to a search for stolen property by his employer. Id. at 645. Although no dispute existed that the employee consented to a search, disagreement as to the scope of the search prevented
the court from ruling in favor the defendant employer. Id. at 647.
However, no similar dispute as to the scope of the search exists between Haul n' Ride and Alazork in the present case. Because Alazork
signed the agreement, he expressly agreed to all rental terms and conditions including the use of GPS technology to locate the vehicle in emergency situations. The common meaning and understanding of the term
"emergency" may be stated as "a situation, often dangerous, which arises
suddenly and calls for prompt action." New Webster's Dictionary and
Thesaurus of the English Language (School, Home & Office ed. 1995).
Emergency situations include obtaining location information of a rental
truck in order to thwart potential terrorist activities.
Because Alazork voluntarily solicited the services of Haul n' Ride
and entered into a rental agreement, he consented to the use of GPS
technology to locate the rental truck in any emergency situation. Emergency situations often occur under the most remote and unforeseeable
circumstances. Obviously, GPS technology provides location information
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when mechanical failure occurs or when a traffic accident arises. However, GPS technology can also assist law enforcement in finding children
abducted by kidnappers. Simply because the emergency situation involved in the present case did not involve foreseeable circumstances such
as a car accident or vehicle malfunction does not lessen its status as an
emergency. Because Haul n' Ride obtained the necessary legal and personal permission to use the GPS technology in its rental vehicle, no intrusion occurred.
B.

HAUL N' RIDE'S USE OF

GPS

TECHNOLOGY IN RENTAL VEHICLES

CANNOT BE CONSIDERED OFFENSIVE OR OBJECTIONABLE
AFTER GIVING CONSIDERATION TO FACTORS
INDICATING OFFENSIVE OR
OBJECTIONABLE CONDUCT.

Even assuming Haul n' Ride's use of GPS technology amounted to an
intrusion, the alleged intrusion did not rise to a level that would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. Under the Marshall intrusion upon seclusion statute, the defendant's activity must amount to
conduct that would be offensive to a reasonable person.
When the undisputed material facts demonstrate no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on a person's privacy interest, the question of invasion may be determined as a matter of law.
Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Courts address certain factors in determining the offensiveness of a person's conduct, such as:
1) the degree of the intrusion;
2) the context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding the
intrusion;
3) the intruder's motives and objectives;
4) the setting into which the intruder intrudes; and
5) the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.
Id. An important theme arising in the discussion of these factors in the
Deteresa opinion focused upon the fact that the alleged intrusion occurred in public view. Id. at 466.
1.

The degree of any intrusion is minimal when considered within the
context, conduct, and circumstances.

During the infamous O.J. Simpson murder controversy, American
Broadcasting Companies ("ABC") approached Deteresa for a television
interview regarding her knowledge of Mr. Simpson. Id. at 462. She declined the interview but later learned that her initial encounter with
ABC had been recorded. Id. at 463. ABC later broadcast a short clip of
the videotape. Id. In finding that no substantial intrusion of Deteresa's
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privacy occurred, the court of appeals emphasized that Deteresa was
videotaped in public view by a camera person in a public place. Id. at
466. The camera person operated the video recording device from across
the street, and because the camera crew did not encroach on her property, any intrusion upon Deteresa's privacy was de minimis. Id.
Similarly, any intrusion upon Alazork's privacy was also insubstantial. First, Alazork was not operating his own personal vehicle; rather,
he rented a commercial vehicle from Haul n' Ride. The United States
Supreme Court has held that an individual's expectation of privacy in
commercial property is less than the expectation of privacy in an individual's home. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). Therefore,
Alazork's privacy expectations should be less than if he had been operating his own personal vehicle. Second, Alazork had notice of the potential
use of GPS technology under the terms of the rental agreement. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, Alazork drove the vehicle to his college
and parked it in a convenience store parking lot. (R. at 5.) Alazork made
absolutely no attempt to conceal his identity or otherwise protect his privacy. In fact, he parked in a public venue which was open to and accessible by any passerby. Such undisputed facts negate any impact on
Alazork's privacy expectations.
Additionally, GPS technology causes little or no intrusion. In fact,
GPS technology involves no physical intrusion; instead, it utilizes a system of satellites to pinpoint location within one hundred feet. See Aaron
Reneger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 Hastings L.J.
549, 550 (2002). While GPS technology was originally developed by the
United States military to navigate submarines and guide missiles, many
current commercial applications of the technology exist. Id. Now, GPS
receivers can be embedded in cellular telephones, watches, and laptop
computers. Id.; see also Richard C. Balough, Global PositioningSystem
and the Internet: A Combination with Privacy Risks, 15 Chi. B. Assn.
Rec. 28, 29 (Oct. 2001). Because the use of GPS technology is rapidly
becoming a widely accepted commercial application, and no physical intrusion arises from its use, the degree of intrusion upon Alazork's privacy expectations is minimal.
2. Haul n' Ride possessed legitimate motives and objectives, and
Alazork's privacy expectations were diminished.
Haul n' Ride's motives and objectives in performing the intrusive
acts must also be examined. In other words, this Court should consider
the purpose of the intrusion and whether the thing being intruded upon
is entitled to privacy. I.C.U. Investigations,Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685,
689 (Ala. 2000). Furthermore, the overall context of the alleged intrusion should be examined including the circumstances under which the
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alleged intrusion occurred. Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 149 F. Supp.
2d 1106, 1110-11 (D. Minn. 2001). In I.C.U. Investigations, Jones suffered from a work-related injury and sought workers' compensation benefits. 780 So. 2d at 687. Jones's employer hired an investigative
company to watch Jones's daily activities. Id. While parked on the
shoulder of one of two roads near Jones's mobile home, investigators
videotaped Jones urinating in his front yard on several occasions. Id.
Jones filed suit alleging invasion of privacy. Id. at 688.
The Alabama Supreme Court noted that because the extent of
Jones's injuries presented an issue in his workers' compensation claims,
he should have expected a reasonable investigation regarding his physical capacity. Id. at 689. Concluding that the purpose of the investigation
was legitimate, the court turned to the issue of whether the investigation
was objectionable or offensive. Id. Because Jones was watched and
taped in his front yard, exposed to public view, the investigators intrusion was not wrongful. Id. The front yard was located such that Jones
could be viewed from either of two public roads, and the investigators
never entered or taped activities occurring within the home. Id. A reasonable person could not find the intrusion objectionable or offensive. Id.
Similarly, Haul n' Ride possessed legitimate purposes and motives
for collecting the location information of their truck. Virtually every aspect of American society has changed in light of recent events. Foreign
entities and extremist American factions catapulted the issue of terrorist
activities into forefront of American media by their acts. After tragic
bombings at home and abroad, Americans have become much more
aware of the havoc that may be reaped on our great nation. Because
Haul n' Ride was informed that its trucks might be used by those seeking
such death and destruction, Haul n' Ride was familiar with the potential
for future terrorist activities even before the rest of the country became
keenly aware of the actuality on September 11, 2001. In its attempt to
combat such activities, Haul n' Ride contacted Mr. Streeter after receiving notice from the FBI of potential terrorist activities in the region. Mr.
Streeter's use of GPS technology, under the circumstances, to locate its
rental trucks must be considered legitimate. Furthermore, Alazork's actions of parking the vehicle in full public view diminished his privacy
expectations' just as Mr. Jones's expectations of privacy were diminished in I.C.U. Investigations. Consequently, any intrusion by Haul n'
Ride cannot be considered wrongful, offensive, or objectionable.

1. Alazork's diminished expectation of privacy is further discussed in Section I(c),
infra.
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The location in which Haul n' Ride placed the GPS receiver further
negates the intrusiveness of GPS technology.

Finally, the setting into which Haul n' Ride intruded provides additional grounds that Haul n' Ride's acts were not offensive or objectionable. Haul n' Ride places the GPS receivers inside the trucks' engine
compartments. Such placement neither invades any part of the vehicle
which Alazork could use for private matters, nor does the receiver interfere with Alazork's ability to use the vehicle for moving purposes. Thus,
taking into account the various factors indicating offensive or objectionable conduct, Haul n' Ride's use of the GPS technology did not rise to the
level of intrusion that a reasonable person would find offensive.
C.

ALAZORK'S CONDUCT EVIDENCED

No

EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.

The legitimate expectation of privacy represents the touchstone of
privacy law in America. See, e.g., Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 877; see also Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (holding that the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis is whether an individual maintains a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."). A plaintiff
asserting such a claim "must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy." Id. (quoting Hill v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994)). In other
words, a person's behavior may give rise to an inference that he retains
no privacy expectations in some aspects of his affairs. Id. Even Samuel
D. Warren and Louis Brandeis acknowledged this principle in their famous article which founded the common law's recognition of an individual's right to privacy. See Samuel D. Warren, and Louis Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L Rev. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis
avowed that "the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is
his shall be given to the public.... The right is lost only when the author
himself communicates his production to the public,-in other words,
publishes it." Id. at 199-200. Some of the most often litigated privacy
expectation issues arise in the criminal context because the United
States Constitution provides stringent protections for individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
Due to these heightened privacy protections, principles set forth in criminal cases are helpful in examining Alazork's expectation of privacy.
1. Privacy expectations are lessened when in public places.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has limited a person's privacy
expectations when he is in public places. United States v. McIver, 186
F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). In McIver, law enforcement officers, suspecting McIver of cultivating marijuana plants in a national park, placed
video and still cameras in areas of the park where the plants were grow-
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ing. Id. at 1122. After the defendant's vehicles were photographed in
the area, officers placed a magnetized tracking device (similar in principle to GPS technology) on the undercarriage of McIver's vehicle. Id. at
1123. McIver was later indicted for possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver. Id. at 1124.
On appeal, McIver asserted that the use of an unmanned camera
constituted an unreasonable search. Id. at 1125. However, the court of
appeals rejected this contention, recognizing that "nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them." Id. (citations omitted). Observation of the
marijuana site with unmanned cameras did not violate the constitution
simply because the more cost-effective "mechanical eye" was utilized by
law enforcement. Id.; see also Hudspeth v. Arkansas, No. CR 01-1222,
2002 WL 1339891, at *4 (Ark. June 20, 2002) (holding that use of photographic equipment does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as
the information obtained could have been lawfully observed by a law enforcement officer). Similarly, GPS technology reveals no more than what
could be observed by the naked eye.
Instead of spending significant amounts of time and money on hiring
an individual to physically locate and view the placement of Alazork's
rental truck, Haul n' Ride employed a more cost-effective and efficient
means of gathering the same information. The undisputed facts establish that Alazork parked the truck in a parking lot, open to the view of
any passerby, thereby defeating any expectation of privacy Alazork may
have in his location information. Such reasoning falls within the holding
of the Ninth Circuit in McIver. 186 F.3d at 1125-26 (holding that
"[illegal activities conducted on government land open to the public
which may be viewed by any passing visitor or law enforcement officer
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy under such circumstances."). Of
course, the court did recognize that even in public places, some expectation of privacy may exist in some circumstances such as in hotel rooms, a
cabin, or an enclosed tent. Id. at 1126. However, just as McIver made no
attempt to conceal his activities from public view, Alazork made no attempt to conceal the location of the rental truck. Thus, no reasonable
expectation of privacy existed.
2.

Use of GPS technology does not require a search warrant under the
heightened protection of criminal cases.

Recently, a Washington state court addressed the use of GPS technology and privacy expectation issues. See Washington v. Jackson, 46
P.3d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). In Jackson, law enforcement officers
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sought and received a warrant to attach a GPS device on a murder suspect's vehicle in an attempt to find the victim's body. Id. at 261. Using
the information collected from the GPS, investigators located the victim's
body and other incriminating evidence used to convict the defendant. Id.
at 261-62. On appeal, the Washington appellate court held that probable
cause for the arrest warrants securing the use of the GPS was ultimately
unnecessary. Id. at 269. A fundamental pillar of privacy law states that
"what is voluntarily exposed to the general public and observable without the use of enhancement devices from an unprotected area is not considered part of a person's private affairs." Id. (citations omitted).
Applying this fundamental law, the court held that monitoring the defendant's public travels with a GPS device may be "reasonably viewed as
merely sense augmenting, revealing open-view information of what
might easily be seen from a lawful vantage point without such aids." Id.
(citations omitted). Similarly, because the information was collected
with GPS technology, Alazork can assert no expectation of privacy in his
location information as the same information could have easily and lawfully been obtained with the naked eye in open-view.
D.

THE USE OF

GPS

TECHNOLOGY DID NOT CAUSE ALAZORK'S ANGUISH
OR SUFFERING.

Generally, establishing causation requires sufficient facts that a defendant's conduct substantially caused the injury claimed by the plaintiff. Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 782 (5th Cir. 2000). Alazork's
alleged damages resulted from Mr. Streeter's statements to Mr.
Babazork, and not from the use of GPS technology. The record indicates
that Alazork lost his scholarship due to Mr. Babazork's conversation
with Mr. Streeter. (R. at 6.) Because Alazork failed to establish that the
damages he suffered resulted from the use of GPS technology, Marshall
Rule 56 mandates that Haul n' Ride receive judgment as a matter of law.
Applying the law relating to intrusion upon seclusion to the evidence, Haul n' Ride committed no intrusion upon the private affairs of
Alazork. Furthermore, no aspect of the alleged intrusion can be classified as offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. Applying the
law to the undisputed facts, the only reasonable conclusion is that Haul
n' Ride committed no intrusion upon Alazork's seclusion. Thus, the Potter County Circuit Court properly granted Haul n' Ride's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
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II. HAUL N' RIDE'S STATEMENTS WERE PROPERLY
CHARACTERIZED AS OPINION OR FAIR COMMENT
WHICH PROVIDE AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
TO DEFAMATION CLAIMS.

Alazork's second claim alleges that Haul n' Ride defamed him by
their statements to Mr. Babazork. However, because the law affords an
affirmative defense of opinion or fair comment, the First District Court of
Appeals properly held that Haul n' Ride's statements regarding Alazork
were not subject to defamation liability. Specifically, Haul n' Ride's
statements to Mr. Babazork amounted to expressions that Mr. Streeter
was concerned that Alazork "might be involved or in trouble," referred to
Haul n' Rides' notice of possible terrorist activities, and indicated that
Alazork was parked at an adult bookstore. Because Mr. Streeter's statements fall within the definition of protected opinion and fair comment,
the Potter County Circuit Court appropriately rendered summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride.
A.

HAUL N' RIDE'S REFERRAL TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST THREATS AND
STATEMENT THAT ALAZORK "MIGHT BE INVOLVED OR IN
TROUBLE" ARE EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION NOT
SUBJECT TO DEFAMATION LIABILITY.

The exception of opinion in defamation law is largely rooted in the
United States Supreme Court decision in Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court unambiguously stated that
"[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." Id.
at 339. Conversely, however, "there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact." Id. at 340. Consequently, courts across the nation
have struggled with the often confusing distinction between fact and
opinion.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 566 describes the application of defamation law and opinions as the following:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of
an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1976) (emphasis added). Building on the Restatement rule, two types of opinions exist: pure opinions
and mixed opinions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b
(1976). A pure opinion exists when the defendant states the facts on
which his opinion is based. Id. An opinion based upon disclosed or assumed non-defamatory facts is insufficient to establish liability for defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1976). On the
other hand, a mixed opinion is an opinion apparently based on facts not
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stated or assumed to exist. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt.
b (1976). Consequently, a mixed opinion gives rise to an inference that
undisclosed facts form the basis of the defendant's opinion. Id. When
the inference of undisclosed facts arises, liability for defamation may exist. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1976).
Focusing on the Supreme Court's statements in Gertz, several
Courts of Appeals have further developed and explained the distinction
between statements of fact and opinion, and the liability attached to
each. Recognizing that Gertz left many questions unanswered as to the
distinction between fact and opinion statements, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals examined various approaches to clarify the distinction. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Adopting a
totality of the circumstances approach, the court addressed four factors
in determining whether an opinion may be reasonably characterized as
making factual assertions. Id. at 979. The four factors utilized by the
court of appeals may be summarized as follows:
1) the common usage or meaning of the specific language;
2) the statements verifiability as being objectively true or false;
3) the full context of the statement; and
4) the broader context or setting in which the statement appears.
Id.
1.

The common usage and meaning of the language used indicates
that the statements are opinion.

As an example of the first factor, the common usage and meaning of
the words, the court used the classic example of an accusation of a crime.
Id. at 980. Obviously, such a statement may be "laden with factual content," however, statements that are "loosely definable or variously interpretable" cannot support an action for defamation. Id. In the present
case, the context of Mr. Streeter's words closely resemble the "loosely definable or variously interpretable" comment. The common usage of the
words Mr. Streeter used, "might be involved or in trouble," cannot be
interpreted as a direct accusation of a crime. Rather, the terms "might
be involved or in trouble" may be interpreted in many different contexts.
When situations arise such that the plain meaning of the words may
be interpreted differently, some states invoke the common law "innocent
construction" rule. For example, in Illinois, if a statement may be innocently interpreted, it should be so interpreted. Mittleman v. Witous, 552
N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ill. 1990). Consequently, every innocent inference
should be made in favor of Haul n' Ride.
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Haul n' Ride's statements are incapable of being objectively verified
as true or false, thus indicatingan opinion.

Secondly, the court of appeals in Ollman held that the court should
consider the verifiability of the statement. 750 F.2d at 981. "[A] reader
cannot rationally view an unverifiable statement as conveying actual
facts." Id. Mr. Streeter's statement that Alazork "might be involved or
in trouble" cannot be objectively verified as true or false. When the uttered statement connotes varying interpretations, the lack of precision
makes the statement incapable of being proven true or false. McCabe v.
Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that the term "scam"
may mean different things to different people, consequently the assertion that "X is a scam" is incapable of being proven true or false). "[The
trier of fact may improperly tend to render a decision based upon the
approval or disapproval of the contents of the statement, its author, or
its subject." Ollman, 750 F.2d at 981. Therefore, the circuit court correctly rendered summary judgment because unverifiable statements of
opinion should be made as a matter of law. Id. This lack of verifiability
of the statement must also be considered in light of the third factor: the
context in which the statement occurs.
3.

The immediate context of the expression suggests that the statement
is an opinion.

The degree of factual content arising from a statement of opinion
depends upon the context of the statement taken as a whole. Ollman,
750 F.2d at 982. For example, in McCabe, supra, the plaintiff operated
time share condominiums. 814 F.2d at 840. After an encounter with one
of the plaintiffs salespersons, the defendant published an article that
labeled the plaintiffs operation a "scam." Id. Addressing the statement
in context, the court noted that the defendant "extensively and accurately described his encounter with the resort salespeople, thereby disclosing the basis for his assertion that it was a scam." Id. at 843. As
previously stated, a pure opinion based upon disclosed facts cannot satisfy an action for defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566
cmt. c (1976).
Similarly, Mr. Streeter extensively and accurately disclosed the underlying facts upon which he based his opinion that Alazork "may be involved or in trouble." Mr. Streeter unambiguously informed Mr.
Babazork that he had received a report of suspected terrorist activity.
Mr. Babazork was also informed that Alazork violated the rental agreement by taking the truck out of the state. Because these underlying nondefamatory facts were disclosed to Mr. Babazork, Mr. Streeter's opinion
that Alazork "might be involved or in trouble" amounts to protected opinion no matter how derogatory the opinion may have been. RESTATEMENT
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TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1976) ("A simple expression of opinion
based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient
for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable
the opinion may be or how derogatory it is.") (emphasis added). Thus,
just as the term "scam" in McCabe could not reasonably be considered
defamation, Mr. Streeter's statement to Mr. Babazork, considered in the
context of the disclosed facts, cannot be sufficient to uphold an action in
defamation.
(SECOND) OF

4.

The broader social context of the statement supports a holding that
the statement is an opinion.

Finally, when determining whether a statement should be characterized as opinion or fact, courts must consider the broader social context
into which the statement fits. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 983. Clearly, the social context and setting in which the statement was made has broad implications. Haul n' Ride was aware of the broad implications and took
proactive measures to address them. Recently, Americans generally
have become aware of the same implications because of terrorist activity.
America and other free nations have fallen under attack at the hands of
terrorist organizations, both domestically and abroad. In order to secure
our own safety, freedom, and values, Americans must join together in
combating these acts. While soldiers are literally fighting to uphold the
pillars of America's foundation, each and every citizen soldier must stay
ever vigilant and aware in order to prevent terrorist acts against the innocent. Mr. Streeter was simply upholding his duty.
The recent publicity negatively implicating Haul n' Ride rental
trucks in illegal activities has forced the company to be on high alert.
After the FBI alerted Haul n' Ride to possible terrorist activities potentially involving the use one of its rental trucks, the company immediately
contacted its rental managers in an attempt to impede disaster. Mr.
Streeter fulfilled his duty in tracking down all of the rental trucks in his
command, and when Alazork's truck fit the description of the FBI's lead,
Mr. Streeter contacted Alazork's references. Hypothetically, had the
FBI's tip proved true, and Alazork was involved, Mr. Streeter would be
hailed as a hero for preventing imminent death and destruction. Fortunately, Alazork was not involved and the FBI's tip proved to be unfounded. Rather than being rewarded for prompt action and vigilant
awareness, Haul n' Ride faces a lawsuit for upholding its duty to
America.
In speaking with Mr. Babazork, Mr. Streeter did not state, implicitly
or explicitly, that Alazork was a terrorist. By holding that Mr. Streeter's
statements somehow implied derogatory or defamatory facts concerning
Alazork's character, this Court would be encouraging self-censorship of
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the citizens of Marshall. This self-censorship impedes America's objectives in its war on terrorism. Consequently, taking into consideration
both the immediate context of the statement made and the overall social
context of the situation, Mr. Streeter's statement cannot be characterized as anything other than non-actionable pure opinion.
B.

ADDITIONALLY, HAUL N' RIDE IS NOT SUBJECT TO DEFAMATION

LIABILITY BECAUSE FAIR COMMENT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

Early common law did not distinguish between fact and opinion
when imposing liability for defamation. Bentley v. Bunton, No. 00-0139,
2001 WL 1946127, at *12 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2002). However, courts incorporated the affirmative defense of fair comment to "afford[ ]legal immunity
for the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest." Id. (quoting Milkovich v.Lorain JournalCo., 497 U.S. 1, 13 (1990)).
This form of privileged communication extended to expressions of opinion on matters of public concern if the critic's opinion was his own and he
did not make the comment for purposes of causing harm to the object of
the comment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1976);
see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14. Furthermore, the fair comment
privilege extended only to opinions of the "pure" type as discussed above.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14. In sum, the fair comment privilege "afforded legal immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of
legitimate public interest when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact." Id. at 13. The fair comment privilege strikes the balance
between the need for public debate and the need to redress injury to citizens "wrought by invidious or irresponsible speech." Id. at 14. While the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gertz has largely made the fair comment
principle inapplicable, some states still apply the fair comment privilege
in one form or another. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 739
F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In such cases, the plaintiff assumes
the burden of proving that the defendant published the statements
"solely for the purpose of defaming him and not for the purpose of informing the public." Id.
Taking into account the burden Alazork carried to overcome the fair
comment privilege, the court of appeals correctly upheld the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride. As stated
above, the grave impact terrorist attacks have had upon the United
States has been felt by all American citizens. As has been the case for
many years, reporting and investigating possible terrorist activities continues to remain at the forefront of public debate. While the duty to report and investigate terrorist activities has become more critical in light
of recent events, it was no less important in years past. Consequently,
Alazork carried the burden of proving that Mr. Streeter published the

128

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXI

statement that Alazork "might be involved or in trouble" for the sole purpose of defaming his good name.
However, the record on appeal clearly establishes that Mr. Streeter
had no intent to defame Alazork. Haul n' Ride's security director received a report of possible terrorist activities from the FBI. When the
security director passed this information on to the local Haul n' Ride
rental agencies, he directed the managers to locate all of their trucks
immediately. Acting pursuant to this notice, Mr. Streeter located
Alazork's rental truck which fit the description and raised Mr. Streeter's
suspicions. Mr. Streeter's statements to Mr. Babazork cannot be characterized as an attempt to defame Alazork because Mr. Streeter intended
to prevent terrorist activity. Therefore, the Potter County Circuit Court
appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride because Mr. Streeter's comments fell within the bounds of the fair comment privilege.
C.

HAUL N' RIDE'S STATEMENT THAT ALAZORK PARKED IN FRONT OF AN
ADULT BOOKSTORE IS TRUE, AND THEREFORE, NOT SUBJECT TO

LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION.

Alazork failed to sufficiently meet the falsity element of a defamation action regarding Mr. Streeter's statement that Alazork parked the
vehicle at an adult bookstore. To prove defamation, Alazork must have
established that Haul n' Ride made a false and defamatory statement. It
is not enough that the alleged statement is defamatory; rather "the
statement must also be false or carry a false implication." Schoff v. York
County, 761 A.2d 869, 871 (Me. 2000); see also Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737
So. 2d 706, 716 (La. 1999). No liability exists for a true statement unless
the statement is incomplete. Schoff 761, A.2d at 871; see also Randall's
Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995) ("In suits
brought by private individuals, truth is an affirmative defense to slander."). In fact, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "in defamation actions, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the
prevailing view is that truth is a defense." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 489 (1975). For example, in Schoff, a local newspaper published a story stating that Schoff went to the jail to deliver sneakers to
her son, and jail officials found hacksaw blades concealed within the insoles. 761 A.2d at 870. Schoff filed a defamation action alleging that the
statements implied that she attempted to break her son out of jail. Id. at
871. The court held that no material facts were omitted and the statements did not carry with them a false implication, thus recognizing the
general rule that true statements do not carry defamation liability. Id.
at 872. Only when omitted statements would "dispel the defamatory
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sting" does a true statement of fact give rise to a claim for defamation.
Id.
Despite the fact that parking in front of an adult bookstore is considered by some defamatory to Alazork's character, the fact is nevertheless
true. Mr. Streeter informed Mr. Babazork of the true fact without implying any further factual connotations. No matter how unappealing this
fact may be no defamatory liability exists. Because the affirmative defenses of opinion and fair comment apply, the circuit court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride.
III.

NO VIOLATION OF THE DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
ACT EXISTS BECAUSE HAUL N' RIDE COMMITTED NO
DECEPTIVE ACT OR PRACTICE WITH AN INTENT THAT
ALAZORK RELY UPON HAUL N' RIDE'S ACTS OR OMISSIONS.

Alazork's final claim against Haul n' Ride asserts a violation of the
Marshall Deceptive Business Practices Act. However, the use of GPS
technology was not a material fact, and Haul n' Ride fully disclosed the
various rental rates; thus, the Circuit Court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Haul n' Ride. The Marshall Deceptive Business
Practices Act provides:
Unfair deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use
or employment of any deception fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with the intent that others rely upon the concealment,
suppression or omission of such material fact, in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful if, in fact, a reasonable
person could be misled, deceived or damaged by said representations.
MARSHALL REVISED CODE § 505 MRC 815/2. Establishing a violation
under the Deceptive Business Practices Act requires proof of 1) a deceptive act or practice concerning a material fact, 2) a defendant's intent
that the plaintiff rely upon the deceptive act or practice, and 3) the deceptive act occurring in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce. Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001);
Celex Group, Inc. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1128
(N.D. Ill. 1995); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill.
1997). Although the Deceptive Business Practices Act should be construed liberally, courts should not use the statute to "transform
nondeceptive and nonfraudulent omissions into actionable affirmations."
Mackinac v. ArcadiaNat'l Life Ins. Co., 648 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (citations omitted).

130
A.

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW
DISCLOSURE OF

GPS

[Vol. =X

TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE

RENTAL TRUCK TRANSACTION, AND HAUL N' RIDE FULLY DISCLOSED THE
PRICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ONE-WAY AND LOCAL RENTALS.

1. Haul n' Ride had no duty to disclose the use of GPS technology
because it was not essential to renting.
The Deceptive Business Practices Act prohibits the "misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact" in

trade or commerce. MARSHALL REVISED CODE § 505 MRC 815/2. A material fact consists of information in which "a buyer would have acted differently knowing the information, or... concerns the type of information
upon which a buyer would be expected to rely in making a decision
whether to purchase." Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc. v. U.S. Office Equip.,
Inc., 250 F.3d 570, 576 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Connick, 675 N.E.2d at
595. Stated another way, "the fact 'must be essential to the transaction
between the parties.'" Cozzi, 250 F.3d at 576 (quoting Ryan v. Wersi
Elec. GmbH & Co., 59 F.3d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In Ryan, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced him to purchase stock in one of the defendant's subsidiary companies. Ryan, 59 F.3d at 53. The district court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff because he failed to establish that the alleged misrepresentations were material. Id. According to the plaintiff, the defendant promised to grant him exclusive distributorship rights upon the
purchase of the stock. Id. at 54. However, none of the plaintiffs agreements contained such a promise. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that if
the plaintiff had considered exclusive distributorship an essential element of the transaction, he would have insisted upon the inclusion of
such a provision in the agreement. Id.
The Seventh Circuit contrasted the Ryan decision with the facts set
forth in Cozzi. Cozzi involved a lease agreement for photocopier equipment. 250 F.3d at 573. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant informed him that, although the leases required monthly payments for a
minimum number of copies, he would only be accountable for the actual
number of copies made. Id. Contrasting the alleged misrepresentation
with Ryan, the court of appeals stated, "[m]ost importantly, the provision
in Ryan was collateral to the purchase of the company's stock. Here, by
contrast, the alleged misrepresentations go to the very heart of the contract-the amount that Cozzi was required to pay U.S. Office for use of
the photocopiers." Id. at 576 (internal citations omitted).
Under the guidance of the Seventh Circuit decisions, the use of GPS
technology cannot be considered an essential element in the transaction
between Haul n' Ride and Alazork. The record indicates that Alazork
needed a rental truck in order to move back to college for the fall semester. (R. at 3.) Nothing in the record indicates that Alazork considered
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the use of GPS technology in the rental trucks as essential to his decision
to rent the vehicle because he never inquired into the use of GPS technology in the trucks. Just as the exclusive distributorship rights involved in
Ryan proved to be immaterial, any of Haul n' Ride's omissions regarding
the potential uses of GPS technology are also immaterial.
However, assuming the use of GPS technology rises to the level of a
material fact, this Court should find that no omission occurred. In Bober
v. Glaxo Wellcome, buyers of the pharmaceutical drugs Zantac 75 and
Zantac 150 filed an action against the drug manufacturer alleging that
the manufacturer provided false and misleading information on the substitutability of the two drugs. 246 F.3d at 936. The drug manufacturer
provided both a hotline telephone number as well as an Internet Web
site to provide information on the drugs. Id. at 937. In holding that the
manufacturer committed no violation of the deceptive business practices
statute, the court stated "that examining the statements at issue, together and in the context of the other information available to Zantac
users, eliminates any possibility of deception with regard to substitutability." Id. at 940. Similarly, Haul n' Ride noted in its rental
agreement that its rental trucks may be equipped with GPS technology,
and Haul n' Ride may use this technology for emergency location services. Although the term emergency may be broad, no question arises
that the circumstances of the present case involved an emergency
circumstance.
2. Haul n' Ride fully disclosed the price differences between local and
one-way rentals.
Failing to disclose information can be deceptive under a consumer
unfair trade practices act only if, under the circumstances, a duty to disclose the information exists. Kenney v. Healey Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 730 A.2d 115, 117 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). Various circumstances of
a transaction may give rise to a duty to disclose material information.
Mackinac, 648 N.E.2d at 240. For example, such a duty arises in fiduciary relationships such as an agency relationship. Id. Other times, a
duty to speak occurs when one party specifically inquires as to a material
matter involved in the transaction. See Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd. v.
Delaware, 312 A.2d 632, 634 (Del. 1973) (noting that when a buyer specifically asked a used car salesman about a car's mileage, a duty arose to
disclose the facts relevant to the buyer's inquiry); see also Mitchell u.
Skubiak, 618 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (addressing a buyer's
discovery of defects after purchasing a home the court stated, "[ulpon
plaintiffs' inquiring about the source of [cracks found in the master bedroom's wall and ceiling], a duty to speak arose on behalf of the defendants."). However, Alazork raises no argument that a fiduciary duty
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exists between him and Haul n' Ride, and Alazork failed to inquire as to
any specifics of the local or one-way rental arrangements.
In determining whether a seller has a duty to disclose, an additional
factor to consider is whether an omission could be discoverable through
the buyer's exercise of ordinary prudence. Randels v. Best Real Estate,
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 984, 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Randels, the seller sold
a residence without disclosing to the buyer that a city ordinance required
the owner of the residence to connect the property's waste water system
to the municipal sewer system. Id. at 986. The appellate court stated:
the key question is whether a defendant's misrepresentations or omissions were discoverable through the exercise of ordinary prudence by
the plaintiff, and a finding of liability is made when the defendant misrepresents or omits facts of which he possesses almost exclusive knowledge the truth or falsity of which is not readily ascertainable by the
plaintiff.
Id. at 988 (emphasis added). Because the city ordinance was a matter of
public knowledge, the seller committed no violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the buyers made few, if
any, inquiries about the property. Id. at 989. Had the buyers made a
simple review of the ordinances prior to purchasing the home, they
would have been placed on notice of the hookup requirements. Id. at
988-89.
Although the present circumstances involved no city ordinance or
other applicable law, the same principle applies. Alazork learned of the
two types of rentals available, one-way and local when he contacted Haul
n' Ride. Mr. Streeter told Alazork that one-way rental rates were higher
"because of the cost of maintaining a national network of Haul n' Ride
locations and because the company's insurance expenses were higher for
rentals in which a truck was driven in more than one state." (R. at 3)
(emphasis added). Although Mr. Streeter stated that one-way rentals
involved taking the truck out of state and returning it to a different Haul
n' Ride location, the rental agreement entered into by Alazork expressly
stated, "The truck leaving the State of Marshall will be charged the oneway rental fee." (R. at Ex. B.) The rental agreement unequivocally
states that, under Alazork's circumstances, Alazork would be subject to
the one-way rental fee. Thus, Haul n' Ride made full disclosure of the
rental arrangements to Alazork. Like the buyers in Randels, Alazork
would have been placed on notice if he had simply read the binding
terms of the contract. Furthermore, like the buyers in Randels, Alazork
made no inquiry about his particular circumstances. Rather, Alazork
chose not to inquire in an attempt to avoid the increased one-way rental
charges. Having been caught in violation of the clear terms of the contract, Alazork now attempts to shift the blame to Haul n' Ride.
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EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT HAUL N' RIDE HAD THE REQUISITE

INTENT UNDER THE DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT BECAUSE HAUL
N' RIDE HAD No EXCLUSIVE KNOWLEDGE OR NOTICE THAT FURTHER
DISCLOSURE OF THE CONTRACT TERMS WAS NECESSARY.

In order to establish a claim under the Deceptive Business Practices
Act, Alazork must establish intent on the part of Haul n' Ride. MARSHALL REVISED CODE § 505 MRC 815/2. Intent may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Celex Group, Inc., 877 F. Supp. at 1131. In order to establish intent, a defendant must be placed on notice that it may
be committing a deceptive act.
For example, in Celex, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a relationship by which the parties would buy and sell each other's products.
Celex Group, Inc., 877 F. Supp. at 1119. On several occasions, the defendant purchased advertising space in the plaintiffs magazine issued on
various airline flights. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
granted exclusive marketing rights to sell the defendant's products in its
magazines. Id. at 1120. However, the defendant did not disclose to
plaintiff that it had entered into an agreement with another in-flight
magazine. Id. at 1127. On its erroneous belief that it retained exclusive
rights, the plaintiff placed orders for defendant's products totaling approximately $700,000. Id. Addressing the element of intent in the plaintiffs deceptive business practices claim, the court found circumstantial
evidence that the defendant was well aware of the plaintiffs reliance on
airline advertising to promote its products. Id. at 1131. Because of notice, a reasonable factfinder could infer that the defendant concealed its
agreement with another in-flight magazine because such disclosure
would undermine the ongoing negotiations with the plaintiff concerning
the $700,000 in products. Id.
Notice to a defendant of his deceptive act was also used to establish
the element of intent in Totz v. Cont'l Du Page Acura, 602 N.E.2d 1374
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992). In Totz, the plaintiff purchased a used automobile
from the defendant. Id. at 1377. The defendant referred to the vehicle
as "the cream of the crop" and even placed a sticker on the windshield
stating that the car had undergone a 26-point inspection. Id. at 1376.
However, the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff that the vehicle sustained extensive damage in the past. Id. at 1377. In finding the element
of intent, the court held that ample evidence existed that some of defendant's employees knew of the damage the vehicle had previously sustained. Id. at 1382. The evidence established that the vehicle
underwent an inspection by the defendant's mechanic, and the defendant placed a sticker on the vehicle acknowledging that an inspection
occurred. Id. Based on this circumstantial evidence, the defendant had
constructive notice that the car sustained prior damages. Id. Because
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an individual is presumed to have intended the consequences of his actions, it may be inferred that the defendant's failure to disclose such information to the plaintiff amounted to a deliberate attempt to induce the
plaintiff into purchasing the car. Id.
Conversely, when evidence of a defendant's exclusive knowledge of
particular facts, or notice, does not appear in the record, the element of
intent fails. In Mackinac, the plaintiff purchased an automobile from
defendant, and as part of the transaction, the plaintiff bought a credit
life and disability insurance policy. 648 N.E.2d at 238. However, the
defendant failed to give the plaintiff a copy of her policy at the time of
purchase. Id. Later, the plaintiff submitted a claim under the policy after being deemed disabled due to diabetes retinopathy, a diabetes-related eye disorder. Id. at 239. The insurance provider denied the claim
based on an exclusion for claims arising from a condition diagnosed prior
to the commencement of the policy. Id. The plaintiff filed suit alleging
the defendant failed to inform her of the policy's "good health" requirement at the time of contracting. Id. Rejecting the plaintiffs claims, the
court of appeals held that the defendant's failure to disclose the information was not calculated to induce the plaintiffs reliance. Id. at 240. Not
only did the defendant not have knowledge of the defendant's diabetic
condition, the defendant had no reason to suspect the condition restriction in the policy would be of any consequence to the plaintiff. Id. The
court stated, "[w]ithout such knowledge, defendants could not have affirmatively intended that plaintiff rely upon their alleged failure [sic]
disclose the exclusion." Id. Based upon the above cases, the element requiring intent that a plaintiff rely upon a deceptive act requires a showing that the defendant possessed exclusive knowledge, or was placed on
notice that disclosure of such information was necessary.
The record clearly indicates Haul n' Ride possessed no such knowledge or notice. Alazork contacted Haul n' Ride seeking to rent a truck to
move back to college. However, Alazork made no statements as to the
location of the college that he attended. Mr. Streeter proceeded to disclose the rental fees which included a one-way or local rental fee. Mr.
Streeter described both fees and explained that the increased cost of the
one-way rental fee is due in part to the fact that "the company's insurance expenses were much higher for rentals in which a truck was driven
in more than one state." (R. at 3.) He also told Alazork that local rentals
involve the truck's use "in town." (R. at 3.) Mr. Streeter also presented
Alazork with the rental agreement which stated, "[tihe truck leaving the
State of Marshall will be charged the one-way rental fee." (R. at Ex. B.)
Mr. Streeter had no notice of Alazork's circumstances which would require further disclosure or discussion of the rental arrangements. In
fact, after Mr. Streeter disclosed information regarding the one-way
rental fee and the fact that a truck leaving the State of Marshall fits
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within the one-way rental, Alazork was left with the decision as to what
arrangement to purchase. Alazork, clearly intending to avoid the increased cost, chose the local rental arrangement. After violating the
terms of the agreement, an individual attempting to surreptitiously
avoid such costs should not be able to later assert the seller's omission.
Furthermore, Mr. Streeter had no notice that further disclosure of
the GPS technology was necessary under the circumstances. The rental
agreement plainly stated that "[t]he truck may be equipped with global
positioning satellite (GPS) and/or cellular phone technology for emergency location services." (R. at Ex. B.) Alazork neither inquired as to the
availability or uses of the GPS technology in the trucks, nor did Alazork
request further explanation after entering into the rental agreement.
Absent Haul n' Ride's knowledge that Alazork needed additional information regarding rental fees or the GPS technology, Alazork cannot
maintain that Haul n' Ride omitted material facts with an intent that
Alazork rely upon the omission.
C.

HAUL N' RIDE COMMITTED No DECEPTIVE ACT OR PRACTICE UNDER
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION GUIDELINES.

When addressing a claim under a deceptive business practices act,
courts should give deference to the considerations and "interpretations of
the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Robinson v. Toyota Motor
Credit Corp., No. 90242, 2002 WL 1038728, at *8 (Ill. May 23, 2002). The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") considers certain factors in determining unfairness, including: 1) whether the practice offends public policy; 2) whether the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; and 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers.
Id. (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5
(1972)). Examination of the FTC factors reveals no deceptive act or
practice.
1.

Haul n' Ride's use of GPS technology and price differences do not
violate public policy because neither injure the public or make
competition unfair.

In order to find that a defendant's conduct is unfair or deceptive, a
court need not find satisfaction of all three criteria. Id. at *8 (citations
omitted). "A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it
meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three."
Id. However, Alazork failed to establish any evidence that the use of
GPS technology or the price differences between local and one-way rentals violate public policy.
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A violation of public policy involves an injury to the public, and it is
in the public interest to prevent the use of unfair methods of competition.
See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 295 n.10 (7th Cir. 1976) (citations
omitted). Not only has Alazork failed to establish that Haul n' Ride's use
of GPS technology violates public policy, the use of GPS technology
proves to be a significant benefit to society.
Among the many benefits of GPS technology are uses of GPS in navigation, precision agriculture and mining, mineral exploration and environmental research, telecommunications, electronic data transfer,
construction, recreation, and emergency response. See Office of Science
and Technology, supra. As previously indicated, school districts have advantageously used GPS technology in their buses. Emergency medical
services are able to better serve their communities with increased response time provided by the use of GPS technology. Finally, in the future, parents will be able to better monitor their children's location
through the use of GPS bracelets.
The facts of this case provide an excellent example of the benefits
that GPS contributes to society. Hypothetically, had the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's tip to Haul n' Ride proved true and Alazork had, in
fact, rented the truck with the intention of committing a terrorist act,
countless lives could have been saved. The use of GPS technology allowed Haul n' Ride to immediately locate the vehicle without disclosing
Alazork's personal information. Law enforcement could dispatch personnel to Alazork's location, possibly preventing extensive human casualties
and property damage. Rather than be considered a threat to individual
privacy, GPS technology should be welcomed as a valuable asset to combat terror and assist individuals in their daily lives.
Turning to the practice of charging a heightened fee for vehicles
traveling beyond state lines, a valid reason for such a practice exists, and
this reason was directly communicated to Alazork. When a seller
charges unconscionable fees in return for little or no service, he violates
public policy. See Illinois ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d 924, 929
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (describing where a significant fee was charged to
mobile home owners wishing to sell their homes if the home was not
moved from the park after the sale). Rental agencies provide needed services for individuals who wish to move residences, businesses, or other
personal and commercial property. However, without national networks
such services would be essentially limited to local services, thus causing
significant inconvenience for many individuals and businesses wishing
to move property longer distances. Mr. Streeter explained that the cost
of maintaining Haul n' Ride's national network required an increased fee
for those traveling across state lines. Furthermore, the increased cost
does not depend solely on returning vehicles to remote locations, rather
Haul n' Ride's insurance expenses increase when consumers travel

20021

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

across state lines. Rather than absorb the added costs, Haul n' Ride appropriately shares this expense with customers traveling across state
lines.
2.

Haul n' Ride's conduct is not deceptive because it is not immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct and does not
cause substantial injury.

The final factors for this Court to consider in determining the unfairness or deceptiveness of Haul n' Ride's business practices involve consideration of whether the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous, and whether the practice causes substantial injury to consumers. Both the use of GPS technology and the price differential between one-way and local rentals by Haul n' Ride can be analogized to the
facts in Robinson, supra, where the defendant's conduct did not violate a
state claim under a statute strikingly similar to Marshall's Deceptive
Business Practices Act.
In Robinson, the plaintiffs leased automobiles from the defendant.
Robinson, 2002 WL 1038728, at *1. The plaintiffs' claims under the statute alleged that the defendant's default penalties under the leases constituted an unfair business practice because the lease required both an
excess mileage penalty and payment for excess wear and tear. Id. at *9.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that there existed a "total
absence of the type of oppressiveness and lack of meaningful choice necessary to establish unfairness," because the plaintiffs could have leased a
vehicle elsewhere. Id. Furthermore, the penalty provisions were clearly
set forth in the lease. Id. Consequently, the defendant's conduct was
neither unfair nor deceptive.
Similarly, Haul n' Ride's conduct fails to amount to oppressive behavior or cause substantial injury to consumers. The increased rates for
traveling beyond Marshall state lines are not any more unfair than the
penalty provisions in the Robinson leases. Haul n' Ride disclosed the
difference between local and one-way rentals, both orally and in the provisions in the rental contract. Furthermore, the rental agreement provided for use of the GPS technology in emergency situations. The record
fails to indicate that Alazork was coerced into signing the rental contract
or that he lacked reasonable alternatives in the marketplace. Consequently, under the FTC guidelines, Haul n' Ride committed no deceptive
or unfair practice in violation of the Marshall Deceptive Business Practices statute.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set for above, Haul n' Ride respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in
favor of Respondent, Haul n' Ride.
Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX A:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1976)
SECTION 652B
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
APPENDIX B:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1976)
SECTION 558
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.
APPENDIX C:
MARSHALL REVISED CODE (WEST 2002)
SECTION 505 MRC 815/2
Unfair deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the
use or employment of any deception fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with the intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful if, in fact, a reasonable person
could be misled, deceived or damaged by said representations.

